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Cumulative effect. Since every plant destroyed places an increasingly heavy strain on the remaining plants and interrupts their flow of materials, the cumulative effect is an important factor. This in turn is stepped up by systematic destruction of key plants—power plants, blast furnaces, etc.—on which others depend.
Effect on German Morale
No account has been taken of the crack-up stage in German morale, inevitable in an air offensive of great magnitude. In any consideration of this point it must be borne in mind that:
1. Against each bombardment by night there is no defense except to the extent of small losses now inflicted.
2. Germany will find herself confronted by a breakdown in food and living supplies and the swift destruction of every source of offensive war weapons.
3. Night shifts in plants throughout Germany must work in constant apprehension of shortly impending death or injury, and in the knowledge that as neighboring plants are eliminated their own chances of escape become progressively smaller.
CONCENTRATION
These facts are well known to some of the world's outstanding air authorities, and these facts have led many experts to the same conclusion: the crippling of Germany by a concentrated air attack is practicable provided the air attack is on a great scale. An outstanding summation came last spring from Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, present head of the R.A.F. Bomber Command:
"If I could send 20,000 bombers over Germany tonight, Germany would not be in the war tomorrow. If I could send 1,000 bombers over Germany every night, it would end the war by autumn."
Since neither the facts nor the conclusions are secret, the immediate question arises, why isn't it done?
In the first place, the production of U.S. bombers, huge as it is, has only recently reached the stage where the quantity provides a decisive weapon.
In the second place, American air power has had to be used to stop the gaps in one emergency operation after another, and has perforce been dissipated.
In the third place, public opinion has been confused by "military experts" who argue that because the bombing of Britain was indecisive, air power is still indecisive. This argument receives unwitting support in the shape of pleas for great fleets of super bombers which would require years to build; the misleading implication being that what we now have cannot do the job.
No part of the results described in this analysis can be achieved without a policy of concentration of a large part of our present bombing strength and a refusal to await production still around the corner. It is of primary importance for public opinion to appreciate that U.S. air power dispersed in all the present theaters of action and modern war will be indecisive.
On the basis of known fact, the opportunity is here. In a little while Germany may offset the advantage in air power which today lies with Britain and the U.S. An air offensive that is too late may have missed the one chance to prevent a final German victory in World War II.