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The above four types have a capacity of some three tons of bombs each at medium radii of between 500 and 1,000 miles. British heavy and medium bombers—the Stirling, Lancaster, Halifax, Wellington, etc.—have the same average radii and in some cases much larger bomb capacities.
Production Rate
The United States is now producing the above four types at the rate of many hundreds a month. The schedule originally set by President Roosevelt was 500 four-engine bombers a month. After Pearl Harbor the President ordered this schedule doubled, and under it the United States is due to reach a production of 1,000 a month in 1943. British production of equivalent types is believed to be several hundred a month.
Available Material
United States. Concentration of a substantial part of our production—for four months, say—can provide a task force of more than 1,500 long-range bombers ready for action by the end of 1942. (This allocation would leave ample for maintenance of fronts already in being and for great operations such as the Solomons which must have continued air support.)
Great Britain. The British already possess at least 1,500 long-range types (e.g., Cologne, etc.).
Joint Task Force
The following joint task force could therefore be assembled:
Planes operational . . . . . . . . 1,000 bombers
Planes in active reserve. . . . 2,000 bombers
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,000 bombers
Bombing power per flying
night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,000-5,000 tons
Bombing power per month (assuming ten operating
nights) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30-50,000 tons
(The above assumes that either the 1,000 operational planes are used on any one night, or up to 2,000 per night if sequence of weather limits operations to less than ten nights a month.)
Continuity
Effect. The effect of continuous bombing has been found to be much greater than that of desultory raids, ton for ton. This is due to the effects of secondary fires, disorganization, wrecking of repair equipment, transport and communication systems.
The rate of continuous bombing is controlled by the ability of the attackers to replace their losses.
In general the proportion of losses in bombing raids is decreased as the number of planes used over a given target is increased. One reason is that a large fleet of bombers has greater protection against enemy fighters (because of its vast firepower) and is also impossible to attack except piecemeal because of its size and spread. Another reason: if ten bombers are over a target defended by 100 guns, the ratio is 10 guns per plane. If 100 bombers are over the target the ratio is one gun per plane. Damage to anti-aircraft equipment by bombs and blast interference with radio equipment is also a factor. R.A.F. losses through 1941 averaged 10% per raid, on a long series of small raids. The Cologne, Essen, Bremen mass raids, involving between 400 and 1,000 planes, reduced the loss factor to an average of 4% per raid.