How to Curb North Korea

Threats and diplomacy have failed to curb Kim Jong-il

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But punishment meted out by the U.S.--or by the U.S. and Japan, the partner in the region most willing to isolate the North economically--has a limited impact. China is North Korea's true economic lifeline, and South Korea its second largest trading partner. And last week, despite the missile test, both made it clear that they have little interest in any stringent economic sanctions against the North for the same reason: sanctions might lead to the eventual collapse of Kim's regime. In the view of both countries, collapse equals chaos, with refugees streaming across their borders. Neither wants any part of it. That's why, when asked last Thursday whether China would agree to economic pressure, Jiang Yu, spokeswoman for Beijing's Foreign Ministry, replied only by reiterating support for the six-party talks and restating China's aversion to interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

Beijing's top North Korean negotiator, Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, heads to Pyongyang this week for talks. He may scold the North Koreans for defying Beijing by launching the missiles and possibly persuade them to try another round of six-party talks. But serious sanctions are unlikely to be on the table. Stability in North Korea is what matters to Chinese President Hu Jintao--even if it's the kind of stability only a jailer could love.

GO BACK TO THE BARGAINING TABLE--FOR REAL

A SENIOR DIPLOMAT IN EAST ASIA PUTS IT bluntly: "If there's no military option and there isn't--and you can't get meaningful sanctions--and you can't--and the six-party talks are exhausted--as they appear to be--what's left?"

One possibility is to return to the six-party talks, but with renewed energy and flexibility. Former diplomat Wendy Sherman, who negotiated at length with North Korea during the Clinton years, gives Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice credit for allowing her deputy, former Ambassador to South Korea Christopher Hill, to talk directly to the North Koreans within the six-party construct. It's just that, in Sherman's judgment, Hill hasn't had enough to talk about. "What it appeared Rice couldn't win was enough for Chris Hill to have in his pocket to make a difference," she says. "If you have nothing to negotiate with, you have nothing."

The President could endow his negotiators with a few concessions, such as agreeing to more one-on-one chats between Washington and the North in the context of the six-party talks, to lure Kim back to the table. But given that Kim has turned his back on multilateral discussions for almost a year, the Bush Administration may have to face the fact that if it wants closure on North Korea, it will have to engage in what Kim has wanted all along: direct talks. The goal of North Korea would presumably be diplomatic recognition and security guarantees from Washington, as well as all sorts of economic goodies like those the U.S. and its European allies are offering Iran as incentives to cease its suspected nuclear-weapons program. In return, Kim would have to agree to stand down on his nuclear program.

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