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Nonsense, says the NEI's Fertel. The electric industry's research institute concluded that probably only about 100 people would be killed in such an attack, he says. In any case, Fertel has told Congress, the chances of terrorists provoking such a disaster are "so incredibly low it is not credible." One expert who thinks saboteurs would have a difficult time provoking a meltdown is Georges Le Guelte, a former board member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who advises on nuclear-security issues at the Paris-based Institute of International and Strategic Relations. "It would require a relatively large number of highly experienced experts in nuclear technology to be able to intentionally provoke a nuclear accident from within a reactor," he says. Stephen Floyd, a vice president of regulatory affairs at the NEI, argues that terrorists wouldn't even try: "It doesn't seem very credible to us that terrorists would launch an attack against a nuclear power plant that's very heavily armed, especially when you look at other facilities that aren't so heavily defended that could cause great harm to the public as well." He points to chemical plants as an example.
For his part, Diaz insists that the improvements made in the nation's nuclear plants since 9/11 are adequate. They have included adding physical barriers, checking approaching vehicles at greater stand-off distances and improving coordination with local police and military authorities. Says the NRC chief: "Any terrorist who looks at one of these facilities is going to say, 'This is a hardened target, and I'm not going to have any confidence that I am going to be successful [attacking it].'" Plants have also improved training for guards and capped their workweeks at 72 hours to eliminate the not-uncommon tendency of overworked employees to fall asleep on duty. Previously, guards sometimes worked 80 to 90 hours a week.
The NRC chief says that when it comes to hiring, plant operators are using "a much finer-toothed comb" than before 9/11 to keep troublemakers out. Potential employees are screened through numerous databases, checked for, among other things, mental-health problems, criminal records and questionable behavior in previous jobs. The NRC's confidence in its "insider mitigation program" is so high that the DBT specifically rules out the need to defend against an "active violent insider"--a turncoat employee willing to shoot and kill fellow workers. The DBT does consider the possibility of a single, nonviolent insider working with the terrorists.