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Another issue is the lack of imagination in the scenarios used for training guards at private plants. TIME is refraining from publishing DBT specifics on the weapons that nuclear plants must defend against, but the relatively small arsenal that the NRC gives the "attackers" in its drills doesn't impress Representative Christopher Shays, a Connecticut Republican. The DBT attack force is barred from using many of the weapons detailed in the opening scenario of this story, but, says the Congressman, "if I were a terrorist, I'd feel more than free to use them." The agency doesn't require defenses against weapons that terrorists haven't regularly used, according to a senior nuclear-plant safety expert who has worked with the NRC and the nuclear industry for decades. "The NRC's assumption is that if it's not being used by the terrorists," he says, "it's not reasonable to assume it would suddenly start being used against nuclear power plants."
According to the NRC and the NEI, a force as big as Atta's band or anything bigger than the DBT is an "enemy of the state." That means it's the Pentagon's problem. "We recognize that there can be threats to our plants that are greater than what is defined by the DBT," Marvin Fertel, chief nuclear officer of the NEI has told Congress. "Although our security would provide an initial deterrence, at some point such threats are the responsibility of the Federal Government." That wouldn't necessarily do the plant's defenders any good, though. "They could call for the cavalry, but they'd never get there in time," Orrik says. "These things can be over in minutes."
On the NRC's website, the agency ducks the issue--after raising it in a Q&A--of whether today's nuclear plants are "capable of withstanding a 9/11-scale attack." Before 9/11, there was "reasonable assurance" that the guard force could defeat the then small DBT, the agency says. In the wake of 9/11, it continues, "the defensive capability of the industry has been significantly enhanced." But the website never answers the question it just posed. Could a 9/11-size terrorist force take down a U.S. nuclear power plant?