(11 of 12)
The most significant response was Washington's. Until recently, the Reagan Administration had justified its conciliatory policy toward Pretoria in geopolitical terms: the strategic importance of the sealanes around the Cape of Good Hope and of South Africa as a producer of precious metals and an anti-Communist bastion. Last week's statements from Washington not only omitted all mention of such considerations, but were delivered in a tougher tone than in the past. Secretary of State George Shultz described apartheid as "an affront to everything we believe in" and viewed South Africa's present policies as doomed. "The only question to be determined," he said, "is how [the end] will come about." The U.S. believes the only solution is for black-white negotiations, said the Secretary. "It cannot be done if repression continues."
Shultz stressed, however, that the Administration was sticking to its constructive-engagement approach and its opposition to divestiture and sanctions, which it believes have rarely been effective in other situations. Said Shultz: "If you say the alternative is for the U.S. to remove itself, stop all investment, I don't see that that is taking you where you want to go. You reduce what influence and leverage you have, and you don't have any contact." Just in case the message was not heard clearly enough in Pretoria, White House Press Secretary Larry Speakes told a press briefing late in the week that "we want the state of emergency removed ... The real cause of violence in South Africa is apartheid."
The U.S. policy adjustment, which has been building for some months, began with a series of South African actions of which the Administration disapproved. There was the failure of U.S.-supported efforts to secure the independence of Namibia, the territory also known as South West Africa, which South Africa has ruled since 1920, originally under a League of Nations mandate. The Administration had hoped to arrange for Namibian independence in exchange for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola, but that effort at "linkage" failed, in large part because of South Africa's reluctance to go along with it. Later there was Pretoria's imposition of an appointed interim government in Windhoek, the Namibian capital. Washington has also been jolted by South African raids into neighboring countries. The incursion into Botswana in June, for example, led to the Administration's decision to call U.S. Ambassador Herman Nickel home for consultations; Nickel has yet to return to Pretoria.
A senior American diplomat last week explained South African behavior by suggesting that Pretoria has developed "tremendous unease" over the past year amid the steady rise in violence. "There is an anxiety, an uncertainty that has not existed before. They have tried jailing black leaders, but this is not a led movement. There is an unintended partnership between the A.N.C. trying to take credit for the disturbances, and the South African government trying to blame them on the A.N.C. because the government cannot admit to itself that no one person or organization is responsible."