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"So in 1969 we saw a different world in terms of the nuclear power balance. We saw a different world in the relationship between China and the Soviet Union. The split between the two had really begun in 1959, but U.S. policies had not changed one bit. Now there was no question that a split had occurred. And then the U.S. was involved in the war in Viet Nam. So I had three priorities on becoming President: to change the relationship with China, to change the relationship with the Soviet Union and to bring the war in Viet Nam to an end. What I had in mind was a three-track approach to those problems. I wanted to end the Viet Nam War in a way that would be consistent with U.S. foreign policy interests. I was not seeking, as some unsophisticated or partisan critics have maintained, better relationships with China and the Soviet Union because of Viet Nam. I was seeking them as ends in themselves. It seemed to me very important for us to develop a new relationship with the Soviet Union because of the shift in the nuclear balance. And I was thinking not only of China then, but of China in the next century, and of the future balance of power among the U.S., China and the Soviets.
"To achieve those ends, I had also to consider how to end that war in Viet Nam. One of the options was the nuclear option, in other words, massive escalation: either bombing the dikes or the nuclear option. Of course, there was a third option: withdrawal. Get out. Blame Viet Nam on the Democrats. I rejected the withdrawal option because it would have been inconsistent with our foreign policy interests. At the other end of the spectrum, I ruled out bombing the dikes and the nuclear option. I rejected the bombing of the dikes, which would have drowned 1 million people, for the same reason that I rejected the nuclear option. Because the targets presented were not military targets. Nobody was exactly saying, 'Pave 'em over!' the way our friend in the Air Force, [General Curtis] LeMay, would have suggested. But I didn't see any targets in North Viet Nam that could not have been as well handled by conventional weapons.
"And then the other reason for my rejecting massive escalation: because I was convinced that it would destroy any chances for moving forward with the Soviets and China. So we went with a program of Vietnamization, which we coupled with withdrawal, which we coupled with military pressure, nonnuclear, which we coupled with the negotiating track. We went on all four tracks. And we wound up with not the most satisfactory solution in 1973, but it was a solution."
He frowns and shrugs. In rapid succession he looks perplexed, annoyed, engaged.
"There were three other instances when I considered using nuclear weapons. One was in the '73 war, when Brezhnev threatened to intervene unilaterally in the Mideast. We could not allow Israel to go down the tube. We could not allow the Soviets to have a predominant position in the region. That had to be the bottom line. I wanted to send that message, and putting the weapons on alert did that. We did not so much want to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons as to indicate that the U.S. would resist them, conventional and nuclear. That was my decision. There's been a lot of second-guessing that it was someone else's. It was mine.