(5 of 11)
He enumerates what he considers the requirements for successful nuclear diplomacy. The fingers start counting again:
"One, the U.S. must have unquestioned superiority. Two, the place involved in the conflict must be of supreme American interest. Three, a conventional option must not be available. Four--and this may be the biggest factor--the President of the U.S. must have credibility. Korea fit in all respects. But the main thing was that the Russians did not want to mess with Eisenhower. Lyndon Johnson made this point rather sadly once when I had breakfast with him in 1969. He was talking about the bad advice he got about halting the bombing in Viet Nam. He said that Averell Harriman came to him at least twelve times, and said that if we'd stop the bombing, the Russians would use their influence to restrain the North Vietnamese. Johnson said, 'I did it twelve times, and not a one of them did a damn bit of good. Ike was different,' he said. 'The Russians feared Ike. They didn't fear me.' "
Nixon pauses. He seems amazed by Johnson's confession even now. Throughout this whole discussion of the Bomb's history, he does not move or fidget much, but his voice suggests how involved he is in these recollections.
"In 1956 we considered using the Bomb in Suez, and we did use it diplomatically. The Russians called on us to join them in sending a combined force to drive the British and French out of the area. Eisenhower's response was that that was unthinkable. We were trying to use diplomatic leverage, but he wasn't about to join the Russians against our allies. Well, Khrushchev was feeling his oats, and he made a bloodcurdling threat that the Russians would go in unilaterally. Eisenhower's response was very interesting. He got Al Gruenther, the NATO commander, to hold a press conference, and Gruenther said that if Khrushchev carried out his threat to use rockets against the British Isles, Moscow would be destroyed 'as surely as day follows night.' From that time on, the U.S. has played the dominant role in the Mideast.
"Then there was Berlin." Nixon sits up straight. He is about to tell a story he enjoys.
In 1959 the Soviets were threatening to recognize the East German regime's authority over Berlin, which would have had the effect of denying access to the city for the U.S., France and Britain. It also placed the Adenauer government in jeopardy. Eisenhower made it clear that he would oppose the Soviets' attempt to violate the Four-Power agreement.
"He held a press conference, March 11, 1959. It was Eisenhower at his best. He rambled and rambled. People said he didn't know what he meant. But Eisenhower always rambled deliberately, because he was trying to make a point another way. At the press conference it was mentioned that a new budget had gone up to the Pentagon, reducing American ground forces by 50,000. So one of the first questions shot out of the box by a reporter was if the President, in view of this crisis in Berlin, intended to re-evaluate the cutback.