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In fact, China has been involved less dramatically outside its borders than the Soviet Union, which has Hungary and Czechoslovakia on its record, to say nothing of the Middle East arms race and the mounting of missiles in Cuba. On the other hand, China has consistently posed a subversive threat to its neighbors, with the propagation of a militant revolutionary doctrine that generally scorns peaceful coexistence with "imperialists." Peking backs so-called national liberation movements from Thailand to Mozambique.
Arguing Against Change
Critics argue that U.S. efforts to isolate China have merely given the Communists a unifying and strengthening hate symbol—and spurred more subversion. Some regard the U.S. presence in Viet Nam as a particular blunder, because it may have weakened Viet Nam's historical role as a buffer against Chinese expansion. There is one theory that the U.S. should have let Ho Chi Minh unify Viet Nam and emerge as an anti-Chinese Asian Tito. This may be fantasy. Still, U.S. intervention may have helped to draw the Chinese into the war. The material aid that Peking has furnished Hanoi must give the Chinese a measure of control over North Viet Nam. There is no sign yet that Hanoi is eager to end the war or settle it in Paris, but presumably the Chinese are in a position to put further pressure on Ho Chi Minh to remain adamant.
The contrasting theory, of course, holds that the U.S. effort in Viet Nam has demonstrated that "wars of liberation" cannot succeed cheaply and has stiffened anti-Communist sentiment along China's rim. Some U.S. officials believe that a new U.S. policy would vitiate these benefits by handing Mao a "success" against the U.S. and seeming to signal a lessening of American firmness throughout Asia. Advocates against change also argue that a softer U.S. line would help Maoism recover from its self-inflicted domestic wounds, and would eventually lead the U.S. to break its commitment to Taiwan.
"Re-evaluating our policy means weakening it," says former Congressman Walter Judd, a longtime friend of Nationalist China. Even such moderates as former Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach uphold the older view. "It is China's position that is inflexible—not ours," he says. "Our relations are not bad because of something we are not doing." Says John Gronouski, ex-U.S. Ambassador to Poland and a veteran of fruitless talks with
Chinese diplomats in Warsaw: "The U.S. can do little to sweeten the pot. When Peking is ready to talk seriously, it will —it is as simple and as frustrating as that."
Even so, the case for taking some conciliatory steps toward Peking is based on the likelihood that after the passing of Mao, who is 75, there will be a power struggle in China between the moderates and Mao-style radicals. An easing of tensions between the U.S. and Peking, goes the theory, would strengthen the moderates. Therefore, it might well be unwise to wait until the new regime is actually in place before the U.S. restyles its policy. By trying to draw China into the world mainstream, however futile at present, the U.S. could at least put the onus of intransigence on Peking. At best it could involve Peking in economic and cultural ties that might encourage the moderates.