(5 of 5)
Nonetheless, it is conceivable that Peking's fear of cooperation between the world's two superpowers, aggravated by skirmishes along the 4,500-mile Sino-Soviet frontier, could eventually pressure the Chinese into toning down their hostility toward the more remote of two evils—the U.S. Ultimate accommodation should not be ruled out. At the same time, it is obvious that Moscow is deeply worried about the possibility of a rapprochement between Washington and Peking. In this situation, it seems quite possible that the U.S. could use its China policy as a diplomatic lever for bargaining with the Russians over such pressing issues as arms control and a Middle East settlement. It would, of course, be quite an achievement to do this without substantially undermining the growing U.S. detente with Moscow.
Finding a way out of the China impasse—and exploiting possibilities after that—will demand extraordinary U.S. patience, ingenuity and forbearance. Any overtures toward China at this point may turn out to be a mistake because they might be based on a misreading of Chinese psychology and the country's political mechanisms. But on balance the risks involved seem relatively slight and the case for a change in U.S. policy is powerful.