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Until the U.S. came along, the contras could hardly be considered a threat to Managua. In the years following Somoza's downfall, small bands of former National Guardsmen operated along the Honduran border, making hit-and-run attacks inside Nicaragua. The Somocistas, as they were known, were demoralized and poorly organized. The U.S. set about forcing the various factions to unite under a central command, while the CIA began recruiting students, farmers and other civilians to beef up the force. Then, early this year, the Fuerza Democratica Nicaragiiense (F.D.N.) was established to serve as a respectable political front group for the contras. Though the Guardsmen supposedly do not hold leadership positions in the F.D.N., they do, in fact, run some military operations.
The exact extent of U.S. involvement with the contras remains unclear. One option paper presented by the CIA to the National Security Council in November 1981 projected expenditures of $19.95 million to support a 500-man force. It is unknown what was eventually approved, but the strength of the contras has grown impressively in recent months. A U.S. intelligence source in Honduras estimates that there are now about 200 CIA personnel in Honduras, four times as many as previously reported. Biweekly flights from Panama bring in rifles, machine guns, mortars and grenade launchers. The contras themselves have grown in number, from about 500 in 1980 to as many as 4,500 now. Until last month, they operated from ten camps set up on the Honduras side of the border. But after the Sandinistas pinpointed the bases, they were moved to other locations, usually just a few miles away.
The Sandinistas have helped the insurgency with their heavyhanded campaigns against the Miskito Indians and campesinos (peasant farmers). Suspecting separatist sentiments among the country's 100,000 Miskitos, most of whom live in the northeast region, Managua ordered the Indian towns burned and the villagers interned, but the measures only drove more Miskitos over to the contras. The campesinos are disgruntled by the Sandinistas' attempts to force them into communal farming; as a result, many of the 1,500 F.D.N. troops operating in the north-central section of Nicaragua are peasant farmers. Once recruited, they undergo a five-week CIA training course in Honduras. The instruction emphasizes ambush maneuvers but also includes marksmanship, compass work and radio operations. The campesinos return to Nicaragua in groups of 40 (including both men and women) under the supervision of five former Guardsmen.
In addition, the Reagan Administration enlisted the aid of Argentina to act as a sort of bagman for the operation. U.S. funds first were sent to the Argentines, who in turn funneled them to the contras. Argentina also sent 200 military advisers to Honduras, but it reduced its contingent to a skeleton crew during the Falklands war last spring. Meanwhile, Washington established its own links with the Honduran military. Honduran soldiers were sent to training camps in Panama run by the U.S. Army's Southern Command Group (SOUTHCOM) and standard field equipment was provided.