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But at some point, according to a U.S. intelligence source in Honduras, the U.S. started to lose its grip on the entire effort and its goals. The F.D.N., for one thing, is interested not just in intimidating the Sandinistas but in starting a real war against Nicaragua. "We will start to pick up the tempo before December," predicted an F.D.N. official. "We will be in Managua by spring."
War or no war, the operation has already had unfortunate side effects on Honduras' fragile democracy. After years of military rule, the Hondurans elected Roberto Suazo Cordova last January as their first civilian President since 1971. The troubles in neighboring countries have given Chief of the Armed Forces Gustavo Alvarez Martinez an excuse to extend his authority. He has won changes in the constitution that broaden his power, and is using the threat of a Sandinista invasion to bolster his military forces and consolidate his power within the country.
In spite of all its efforts, Washington, ironically enough, may be backing the wrong contras. "They are making the biggest possible mistake," observed a leading opposition figure of the Sandinistas in Managua. "The Nicaraguan people are first anti-Somocista, and only secondly anti-Communist." It is commonly believed that for the contras to succeed, a considerable number of Sandinista soldiers would have to enlist in the cause. One of the few men who could make that happen is Eden Pastora Gómez, 46, a popular hero of the Sandinista revolution who grew disenchanted with the revolution and fled Nicaragua in July 1981. Pastora has since surfaced in Costa Rica, and the CIA would apparently tike to enlist his aid. But Pastora adamantly refuses to sign up. He shuns the F.D.N., which he sees simply as a front for the CIA and the Somocistas. Alvarez Martinez, for his part, wants nothing to do with the onetime Sandinista, whom he considers a Communist.
Meanwhile the fear of war remains. If there is a shooting war between the two countries, Honduras will be at a decided disadvantage against the larger and better equipped Nicaraguan army. In that case, the U.S. could be tempted to intervene more openly. For Washington, that prospect underscores the perils of becoming too deeply involved in the region's complex and volatile affairs.
—By Janes Kelly.
Reported by Christopher Redman/Washington and James Willwerth/Tegucigalpa