Middle East Stumbles Toward a Violent Equilibrium

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NASSER NASSER/AP

Palestinians stand in front of the burning wreckage of Force 17 headquarters

This may be as good as Middle East peace gets for the foreseeable future — a smoldering stalemate peppered with sporadic violence. Wednesday's case in point: Israeli tanks and helicopter gunships blasted Palestinian Authority targets in Gaza and Ramallah after a Hamas suicide bomber had earlier in the day killed himself and two Israeli teenagers on the border between Israel and the West Bank. The latest attacks followed two bomb blasts in Jerusalem the previous day for which Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, and ongoing clashes throughout the West Bank. The Israeli attacks came as no surprise — Israel had promised a robust military retaliation, but had waited for the conclusion of the Arab League summit (which wrapped up Wednesday in Jordan) to minimize the diplomatic fallout.

With long-term Israeli-Palestinian political negotiations in the deep freeze, the region appears to be settling back into the relative stability of a low-intensity conflict. Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon hopes to put a lid on Palestinian resistance by selectively striking at activists, while holding out the carrot of easing Israel's collective punishment of blockades and curfews. But he is caught between mounting pressure from his right-wing base to strike back and concern that a heavy-handed response may leave Israel even more isolated internationally. The latest retaliation may well have been targeted at Palestinian militants, but in the absence of any significant moves to ease the blockade on Palestinian towns, its likely only to intensify Palestinian rage.

Arafat's incentive

Despite claims of responsibility by Islamist radicals, the Israeli government has directly blamed Yasser Arafat for the latest Palestinian attacks. The substance of that complaint, really, is that Arafat's Palestinian Authority is giving free rein to Islamist terror groups operating in areas under its control. That's hardly surprising. The incentive for Arafat to restrain Hamas and Islamic Jihad had been the peace process itself, and the possibility it created that dialogue could result in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza being replaced with a Palestinian state. That process collapsed last year at Camp David, and Sharon has refused to countenance new negotiations within the Oslo framework. Under those circumstances, it's hard to imagine Arafat finding cause to send his security forces after the Islamists. For the Palestinians peace was always inextricably linked to their political goals — it's hard to imagine any Palestinian leader opting to simply get along with Israel under the present distribution of land and political power.

The continuing conflict even proved useful Wednesday for Arab League summiteers, providing a point of consensus to paper over their sharp differences over how to end sanctions against Iraq. As expected, members moved to revive an economic boycott of Israel, promised financial aid to the Palestinians and called for an international force to be deployed in the West Bank and Gaza. The latter, of course, is anathema to Israel, and the U.S. on Tuesday night used its veto power kill a U.N. Security Council resolution mandating such a force. The extent to which that alienates the Arab allies Washington needs to hold its line against Iraq will depend largely on the reaction of the Arab street.

Stability, rather than peace, is Bush priority

While it has rejected President Clinton's ill-starred peace activism in the Middle East, the Bush administration has made clear that its own policy will be guided by U.S. interests in the region as a whole, with an emphasis on stability. In other words, the Bush team has less interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than in ensuring it doesn't escalate to the point of threatening regional stability. In the short term, that works for Ariel Sharon — and against Yasser Arafat — by removing U.S. pressure to seek a long-term political solution. But it may not always be that way, particularly if the pressure begins to grow on Arab regimes for more forceful expressions of solidarity with the Palestinians. And the domestic political situation in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as the tradition of deflecting domestic political anger in Israel's direction, may make that inevitable.

Right now, the region will be bracing for a new escalation on both sides, with little sign that the resolve in either side will be broken by their adversary upping the ante. Indeed, Arafat may determine that he has little to gain from allowing the situation to stabilize in the absence of any framework for pursuing his coveted state, and may even be tempted to encourage an escalation of violence in the hope that it may force Arab states and the wider international community to put more pressure on Israel. And for the Israelis, domestic political concerns will prompt Sharon to raise the level of retaliation. In other words, both sides may be squaring off for a long, hot summer.