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Arab nations fearful of Iran mostly maintained a puzzled silence last week while scrambling behind the scenes to find out just what the U.S. was doing. But while Shultz was traveling last week, Iraqi Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon dropped in at the Washington office of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy to pose outraged questions about the arms sales. Murphy, who is the prime manager of U.S. Middle East policy but who seems to have known nothing about the dealings with Iran, was apparently stumped for any answers. The Administration, however, had better come up with some answers quickly. It can expect anguished inquiries from Arab nations friendlier -- and less self- interested -- than Iraq as to whether the U.S. is now tilting to the Iranian side in the gulf war.
Officially, Washington's policy is to proclaim strict neutrality in the bloody conflict and urge both sides to negotiate a settlement that would in effect be a stalemate. That would leave borders about where they are now. U.S. officials claim that one of their goals in setting up the secret meetings with Iran was to gain some influence that might enable the U.S. to persuade a post- Khomeini government to settle for something short of the Ayatullah's often proclaimed aims: total defeat of Iraq and the toppling of its President, Saddam Hussein. During the meetings U.S. officials urged Iranians not to launch Tehran's long-touted "final offensive" to crush Iraq. Whether for that reason or because Iran lacks sufficient military strength, the all-out Iranian offensive is rapidly on its way to becoming a non-event.
But how can conniving at arms transfers that would presumably strengthen Iran in its war against Iraq promote the stalemate that the Administration desires? It would seem more likely to do the exact opposite: help Iran to win. In fact, the Administration claims that Iraq has such an overwhelming firepower superiority that the new weapons will not alter the strategic balance. The White House also maintains that the arms shipments could influence political infighting that may go on inside Iran.
The Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, voiced no opinion about U.S. dealings with Iran; like everybody else, he referred all questions to the White House, and it is uncertain how much he knew about the maneuverings. But Weinberger last week made a point of observing that an Iranian victory in the gulf war would be against U.S. interests. If anything, he was understating the case: an Iranian triumph would be a disaster for the U.S. It would drastically upset the Middle Eastern balance of power and give a victorious Iran new opportunities to threaten or subvert moderate Arab nations that are friendly to the U.S., such as Kuwait and above all Saudi Arabia.
Domestically, the Administration is already hearing some scorching criticism. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger charged that the Administration appeared to have paid "ransom" for release of the U.S. hostages. He added bitterly that the Carter Administration, which he served as Secretary of Energy, "did its groveling in public. This Administration prefers to do its groveling in private."