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Alhough a few reporters were aware of the unusual activity at the White House, the secret held until the Government's carefully couched announcements were ready. The first, issued at 1 a.m., foreshadowed the tone of sorrow over the deaths but no regrets over the mission's launching that Carter later carried personally to U.S. television viewers in his early morning address.
Once that sad duty had been performed, the President returned to the Cabinet Room. There, sometimes aided by Brown or General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he somberly briefed the leaders of Congress. Some had seemed skeptical, puzzled or even angry as they entered, feeling that they should have been consulted under the terms of the War Powers Resolution. But Carter convinced them that the mission was an act of mercy, not of war. What was more, the Senators and Congressmen who had doubted the wisdom of the plan were persuaded that the rescue effort had been a carefully thought through and quite practical operation, despite its dismal outcome. "The plan appeared militarily feasible," said Republican Senator John Tower later. Agreed Democratic Congressman Clement Zablocki, who had earlier criticized Carter's "stupidity": "All members of both political parties praised the President for his courage and were fully supportive of his operation." At week's end Carter prepared a report to Congress in which he gave the bare outlines of the operation and insisted, contrary to statements from Tehran, that no American serviceman remained in Iran.
The legislators who attended the meetings with Carter revealed few of the details about the mission, and Secretary Brown was even more secretive on the subject at his press conference. Gradually, however, the outlines of the plan became clear. The helicopters were to have carried the commandos to a second staging site, named Mountain Hideout, just outside of Tehran, but concealed from Iranian radar and defense forces by mountains. Some of the rescuers were to slip into the embassy compound in trucks—although where the vehicles would come from remained a mystery. At a prearranged time, the rescuers were to disable the unsuspecting guards, presumably with gunfire and some kind of chemical weapon, just as the choppers landed on the embassy rooftops. The helicopters would then carry the hostages and the combat team to a rendezvous with the C-130s. The Sea Stallions would be abandoned as the big Hercules flew everyone to safety.
That sketchy scenario did not satisfy some experts familiar with such operations. They speculated that some kind of help on the ground must have been anticipated—either from Iranians friendly to the U.S. or American agents who had been sent into the country secretly in advance. Said one Israeli military specialist: "You don't gain control over the embassy with 90 men, and you don't do it with eight helicopters." A respected Egyptian magazine called October said that 40 Iranians trained in the U.S. had taken part in the raid. The Administration had no comment to make on the report.