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The time to move now seemed ripe. An International Red Cross visit had determined that all 50 hostages seized at the embassy were still being held in the compound. U.S. planners had learned that the number of militants guarding the captives had declined. Soon the protective darkness of the nights would shorten, and the desert temperatures would soar by day, making it even more difficult for the helicopters to operate in the hot, light air. The period for best operational conditions was narrowing fast. On Thursday, with the Common Market Foreign Ministers having just bowed to Carter's pleas for allied solidarity, the President gave the word Go. The U.S. had swung into action on its own.
On Thursday afternoon, six of the team's C-130s rose from an undisclosed airfield in Egypt, where Carter's increasingly helpful friend, President Anwar Sadat, made no attempt to deny his nation's involvement in the American mission. Said Sadat later: "I have promised the American people that I shall give facilities for the rescue of the hostages and for the rescue of any Arab state in the Gulf."
The transport planes carried about 90 commandos in camouflage garb and another 90 crew members. Following an undisclosed route, the small air fleet droned along as low as 150 ft. to foil Iranian radar as it approached its first staging site in the desert near the isolated village of Posht-e Badam. Other planes are reported to have helped by jamming Iranian detection systems.
One of the many ironies of the entire mission was the fact that the C-130s were heading for a remote spot in the desert that the Iranians had feared might some day be used by U.S. forces. Indeed, they even had a map of the spot. It was discovered in the papers of Mahmoud Jaafarian, a pro-Shah counterinsurgency strategist who was executed after the revolution a year ago. Jaafarian was actually trying to burn the map when he was seized by the revolutionaries. Jaafarian told his captors that the staging site had been secretly built by the CIA, with the Shah's knowledge, for possible emergency use. The Iranian air force proposed destroying the site, suspecting it might contain hidden navigational gear that could guide landing American planes. But so confused was the Iranian government that nothing was done about the matter. When an Iranian officer insisted upon a decision, he was told by a senior official: "The Americans must know the site is discovered. They won't ever consider using it."
One by one, the cumbersome C-130s roared in over the desert and landed on the strip marked out on the salt flats near Posht-e Badam. Meanwhile, the eight RH-53 helicopters were finding the going much more difficult. As they emerged over land from the Gulf of Oman, flying without lights in the moonlit night, two of the choppers ran into a fierce desert sandstorm. Both developed crippling problems. One could not stay aloft because of hydraulic troubles and settled down in the bleak desert. Another helicopter crew found the disabled craft, picked up its occupants and completed the five-hour, 500 nautical mile flight to the landing strip. The second laboring chopper discovered a faulty gyro and turned back to the Nimitz, which was standing offshore. Finally, six of the eight RH-53s reached their destination.