Blackmailing the U.S.

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quickly ruled out a Mayaguezor Entebbe-style attack as impractical under the circumstances. Nor did the Administration have the option of undertaking any kind of covert action inside Iran that might have tempered the situation. When the Shah fell last January, most of the U.S. intelligence apparatus in Iran fell along with him. Confessed one Washington official: "We have reviewed our assets and our options, and they are precious few."

With so many lives in danger, an obvious first step was to adopt a policy of coolness and flexibility. Toward that end, the White House asked both Congressmen and presidential hopefuls to refrain from inflaming the situation. For the most part the candidates agreed. Early in the week, Republicans Ronald Reagan and John Connally criticized the Administration's handling of the affair, only to draw a rebuke from a third G.O.P. contender, Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee. After a briefing session for congressional leaders at the White House, Democratic Senator Scoop Jackson of Washington declared: "Restraint is the order of the day." Teddy Kennedy was one who broke ranks; he criticized the Administration for not having a contingency plan to protect Americans at the embassy.

After Bazargan's government fell, the Administration's next step was to select Clark and Miller to fly to Tehran and negotiate with the Ayatullah. Clark had been an early U.S. supporter of Khomeini and had visited him last January in France; Miller was a former Foreign Service officer in Iran who had opposed Administration policy toward the Shah. The two men had already left for Iran when Khomeini announced that he would not meet with them. The White House told them to remain in Istanbul until the situation became clearer.

Then came a surprising development: an apparent offer by the P.L.O. to try to negotiate for the hostages' lives. P.L.O. Chief Yasser Arafat sent two emissaries, including a close military adviser, Saed Say el (also known as Abu Walid), to Tehran. The State Department said that it welcomed assistance and recalled that the P.L.O. had helped arrange the evacuation of several hundred Americans from Beirut in 1976 during the Lebanese civil war. The Administration was reluctant to depart from U.S. policy toward the P.L.O., namely, that it will not recognize or negotiate with the organization until it acknowledges Israel's right to exist. From the Administration's viewpoint, however, the safety of the hostages was more important than giving the P.L.O. a chance to gain a bit of image-building publicity. If Arafat's emissaries were successful, the Palestinians could boast that they had turned the other cheek by helping Israel's protector and ally; if they failed, the world would at least give them credit for trying. As one Israeli diplomat bitterly observed, "It was a no-lose situation."

The mission did not go well. Fearful of jeopardizing the P.L.O.'s close ties with Khomeini, Sayel announced that he would not be a mediator after all, because the "situation is only related to the revolution in Iran." Some P.L.O. leaders implied that, in the end, Arafat himself might be willing to go to Tehran to try his luck with the stubborn Iranians.

Late in the week, Carter postponed a scheduled trip to Canada because he wanted to stay in close touch with his foreign policy advisers.