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There is deep-rooted resistance to the Tehran government in areas of the country dominated by Iran's powerful, restless minorities. In northwestern Iran a struggle by the Kurds for autonomy has already claimed hundreds of lives. The government realized last month that a continuing guerrilla war in Kurdistan would be disastrously expensive for Tehran and agreed to send four Cabinet ministers to negotiate with the Kurdish rebels. Khomeini said last week that he wanted the mission to continue. But the danger is that, with Bazargan gone, hard liners on the Revolutionary Council might be tempted to try for a quick military solution, thereby inflaming the Kurds once more. That in turn could lead to interference by neighboring Iraq, which has a substantial and equally restless Kurdish population of its own.
A similar difficulty exists in Khuzistan, center of the Iranian oil industry. The Khomeini regime has alienated the 2 million Shi'ite Arabs of Khuzistan, particularly the oilfield workers, who feel that their strikes made a significant contribution to the overthrow of the Shah. The Iranian oil industry also needs technocratic leadership, which the Ayatullah has been unable or unwilling to provide. The current oil minister, Ah' Akbar Moinfar, last week announced that he would suspend shipments to the U.S. "the moment we get orders from the Imam." In fact, no such order was issued, and U.S. companies said that there seemed to be no disruption in supplies. Iran, however, did notify some customers that they would receive 5% less oil than they expected for the rest of the year. No reason was given. The previous oil administrator, Hassan Nazih, had far more autonomy in carrying out his responsibilities. But he resented the constant intervention of the ayatullahs, said so, and was forced out last September. For good measure, the government issued a summons for Nazih's arrest, but he managed to escape to West Germany. Partly as a result of such political interference and mishandling, Iran's oil production gyrates between 2.3 million bbl. and 3.3 million bbl. per day.
It is no surprise that the Ayatullah and his supporters blame most of their persistent troubles on the deposed Shah —and on his friends abroad. Says Iranian Expert James Bill of the University of Texas: "If there is any issue Khomeini's government has seized upon, it is the Shah, whom they consider to be murderous. When the U.S. let him in, even for humanitarian reasons, it was almost predictable that there would be a tremendous reaction in Iran." In Bill's view, many Iranians still fear that the Shah might be attempting a comeback, with covert U.S. assistance. "To us that seems ridiculous," says Bill, "but we are dealing with Iranians and their perceptions of reality." Indeed the question of the Shah's admission to the U.S. is a contentious issue among Americans as well as Iranians; some argue that he should have been welcomed from the beginning as a fallen ally, others that as a disgraced tyrant he had no place in this country.
The Carter Administration found itself woefully short of ways to deal with the crisis. It