Now, Alas, the Guns of May

  • Share
  • Read Later

(10 of 12)

Fortunato Galtieri, 55, went into emergency session at the Argentine army's imposing gray stone headquarters after Haig's announcement. Argentine Interior Minister Alfredo St. Jean described the U.S. attitude as "unjust and unreasonable." A few hours later, the military announced the imposition of formal press censorship in the country.

If there were any waverings within the military leadership after the U.S. decision, they failed to show. But making sense of the labyrinthine workings of the Argentine junta is nearly impossible at the best of times. Although President Galtieri is the group's undisputed chief, the junta operates on a consensus basis that gives the other two commanders, Navy Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, 55, and Air Force Brigadier General Arturo Lami Dozo, 53, considerable power. In addition, junta members must take into account the feelings of other senior military officers, especially the five corps commanders of the 130,000-man Argentine army.

Failure to keep those powerful figures satisfied could result in a palace coup—which is exactly how Galtieri took power last December. Complains a Reagan Administration official who has dealt with the Argentines: "There are 30 to 40 people who can exercise a veto." Indeed, two weeks ago, Haig thought that he had reached an agreement with the Argentines during a shuttle mission to Buenos Aires. As he left the country, however, he was handed a note at the airport rescinding the deal.

Among the junta members, Admiral Anaya is considered to be the most hawkish on the Falklands question. By some reports, it was Anaya who precipitated the April 2 invasion, without fully consulting President Galtieri. Anaya reportedly moved Argentina's only aircraft carrier, the Veinticinco de Mayo, out to sea two weeks ago without telling Galtieri. After some argument, the carrier was returned to the relative safety of the coastal shelf, where the water is too shallow for British submarines to operate safely.

Aii Force Chief Lami Dozo is considered to be far more pacifistic on the Falklands issue. Within his branch of the armed forces there are doubts among some officers about the entire adventure. But the air force, the most junior and traditionally the weakest of the Argentine armed forces in terms of political power, now bears a major responsibility for defending the islands. Says one observer of Argentine military affairs: "Lami Dozo was very dovish until he realized that the air force is at the cutting edge of what the British might do."

From the beginning, the junta has underestimated the adverse international reaction to its invasion. One reason is that military dictatorships are apt to be heedless of public opinion. Another factor may be the Argentine national character: a complex blend of nationalism, volatility, self-absorption and machismo.

For decades, as their country has suffered through regular cycles of political upheaval and economic decline, Argentines have prided themselves on being inherently superior to their neighbors. Largely of Italian and Spanish descent, the Argentines sometimes refer to themselves as "European" to distinguish themselves from other South Americans. The Argentines are notoriously thin-skinned about real or imagined slights to national honor, particularly where territory is involved.

Years of

  1. 1
  2. 2
  3. 3
  4. 4
  5. 5
  6. 6
  7. 7
  8. 8
  9. 9
  10. 10
  11. 11
  12. 12