Iran: A Government Beheaded

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By removing Banisadr, Khomeini eliminated the last channel for peaceful opposition to his regime. He certainly invited the violence of the Mujahedin, a tightly structured group that had helped Khomeini come to power by organizing huge street demonstrations on his behalf in the last months of the Shah's rule. The movement dates from the mid-'60s, when it was formed to oppose the Shah. By 1969 some members of the Mujahedin, organized in cells, were receiving military training from Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon and Jordan. From the start, the group integrated Islam into an ideology favoring a classless society—what one French analyst calls "Islamic Marxist sauce." In 1980, when Rajavi tried to run for President—his candidacy was vetoed by Khomeini—the Mujahedin platform focused on anticapitalist, anti-Western slogans. It demanded the nationalization of all foreign businesses run by Iranians and "continuation of the anti-imperialist struggle," especially against the U.S.

From his new base in France, Rajavi is now making statements designed to gain broader acceptance outside Iran. He says that he would govern with a national council including representatives of all the forces "who agree with our line of independence and freedom, except the allies of the Shah and Khomeini." Asked why his promises should be more credible than those of Khomeini, who also pledged free speech and a pluralist society during his exile in France, Rajavi answers: "We are not just a group of intellectuals without any responsibility. We have been a popular movement for 17 years, and that means we are responsible."

The Mujahedin strategy is to keep whittling away at Khomeini's increasingly disjointed government. Only 15% of Iranians support the mullahs, the guerrillas believe, while 20% support the Mujahedin, with the middle ground occupied by a huge silent majority passively opposed to Khomeini but afraid to speak out. The purpose of the current campaign, says one Mujahedin leader, is to "break the barrier of terror" that keeps many Iranians from opposing Khomeini openly. The Mujahedin do not shy away from applying their 3 own brand of terror. Dozens of Iranians heeding Khomeini's call to be "informers for God" by turning in neighbors and relatives who oppose the government have been executed by the guerrillas.

Not everyone is convinced that this tactic will bring down Khomeini or, if it does, that Rajavi will be the beneficiary. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, an Iran watcher at the University of Virginia, suggests that "Khomeini still has a tenacious hold on the people, especially the lower classes." French experts, who were among the first to predict the Shah's demise, contend that the Mujahedin may have suffered more at the Khomeini government's hands than they are willing to admit. Some Western intelligence sources doubt that the Mujahedin, though superbly organized, have as many followers as they claim. "They are not a popular movement," one analyst asserts. "Their ideology is not understood by the masses. They are capable, of carrying out terror operations but not of governing Iran when Khomeini fades away." Rajavi's sudden flight from Iran may, in the end, hurt his cause. "One can't sit in Paris and run a counterrevolution," says Ramazani.

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