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A. That's operational. I can't go into that. Baghdad is our main effort, there's no doubt about it. You see what's occurred in the press. I believe there's great progress that's happened in the west. Our strategy in the west is doing exactly what we wanted it to do.
There gets a point — given the amount of time that we've been here, number of forces we've had on the ground — when the addition of additional forces can be counter-productive. It can only further embed in people's mind that we're an occupation force, with no intention of leaving. It's critical, given this culture — very different from Western culture. I don't think Americans understand how that impacts on every decision that's made and every time a soldier takes an action.
Q. Recently, there have been reports about the Pentagon examining several options for Iraq — scenarios dubbed "Go Long," "Go Hard," and "Go Home." Which of them makes most sense for you as a field commander?
A. That's something that's worked back in D.C. I don't think that's something for me to comment on. We're working on our own portions of a plan, and I provide information to Gen. Casey on an operational level. I believe in the mission. It is what it is, and it is not going to lend itself to a timetable. It's just not. I personally would hate to see whether a timetable causes us to take actions on the ground that we know to be ill-advised.
Q For instance?
Oh, any number of actions. For instance, the reduction of the number of troops we have based on a date on the calendar. I just can't see how that would be the right thing to do. I think that has to be conditions-based, not time-based.
Q. Some politicians in Washington have suggested that the U.S. should start withdrawing troops in four to six months.
A. I'm a fan of being able to start withdrawing within one or two months — when conditions on the ground allow it.
Q Is it fair to say we're nowhere near there yet, that the conditions now don't allow for a withdrawal within four to six months?
A. We could, if we could get some support from the political lines, the governance lines; if we can get some movement towards [sectarian] reconciliation; if we can have some sort of militia policy — if the Prime Minister can make a breakthrough there. I think that could have the effect of us having 40,000 troops deployed here.
Q. What would be the consequences of the U.S. getting it wrong in Iraq?
A. This is absolutely critical, for Iraq, the region, the U.S., that some form of democratic government is created, some form of free market. It needs to be what the Iraqis want, but at the same time it is critical that in a broad sense it be considered a democracy.
I think it's essential Iraq remain a state, and not be split. Because that would allow al-Qaeda to do whatever they want, particularly in what may be called Sunnistan — to declare a caliphate from where terrorists may be launched at other targets. There is no doubt in my mind that is what al-Qaeda would like. They want a foothold in this country.
Q. How much Iraq's efforts to rebuild itself is compromised by the fact that there's an exodus of the best and brightest? Iraqis are leaving their country in the thousands.
One of the reasons they are leaving is because they don't have [economic] opportunities. So we need to create those opportunities, to stop the haemorrhaging.
This is the part of the conflict that has just been so misunderstood by the American people. There's a belief that [we have] a defined enemy out there, and once you either put those folks in jail or you kill them, the fighting it will just stop. And that's just not the case.
This is unlike any other conflict we have been involved with in the history of our country. I honestly believe that. There is not a defined enemy. The kinetic line — the security line of operations — is absolutely essential. But to think that the security line alone is going to bring peace to Iraq, is going to solve the problems you see manifested in the streets of Iraq today, is absolutely foolhardy. It can't deliver that. It cannot deliver that and stay true to the democratic ideals of our nations, because it would literally take a police state. And the democratic ideals that Iraqis voted into their constitution.
It will take a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic lines that deliver at the same time in order get a leg up on this thing. To get people to believe that life is going to get better.
Q. What advice would you give your successor, Gen. Odierno?
A. I'd say, "Work all the lines of operation at the same time, not just the security line." The security line alone is not going to solve the problem.