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A. That's the $64,000 question that we'd all like to know: how much control does Sadr have on the rogues?
Q. With the militias — is there any kinetic component to dealing with them, or is it all political?
A. At this stage right now, it is political. But that could change.
Q. How would you know when it's changed?
A. I think the PM will tell us when that has to change. If he is not able to work through some kind of a political solution, over time.
Q. You can see a political deal is struck and these people drop their guns and go home?
A. Right now, I have to believe that's the case. There can be no solution to Iraq's problems without tackling the militias. And this has to happen soon. We had a chance to tackle the militias in '04 [after a U.S. crackdown against the Mahdi Army], but then people were so happy Moqtada al-Sadr agreed to join the political process that they never forced his militia to disarm.
Q. What improvements have you seen on your second tour?
A. At the end of 2004, the Iraqi Army was nowhere near what it is right now. [Progress] has been really phenomenal. Now, we have some issues in certain units. The ability of the army to get better is somewhat retarded right now because [the Iraqi government] doesn't have the systems in place to move supplies to units in all parts of the country.
We've accomplished a lot, but there are still some serious issues — to deny that would be foolish. The [Jan 30, 2005] elections, we thought, were a strategic victory for everybody. It was hard to leave then, too, because you wanted to stay and see what you can make of what was a tremendous advancement on that particular day.
At the same time, it is the root of many of our problems today. The Sunnis didn't vote in the numbers they could have in many locations — out west, Baghdad, Diyala. In Diyala you have a predominantly Sunni population, but because they didn't vote, the provincial government is all Shi'ite. So you have the problems of a majority of Sunnis that are governed by Shi'ites for almost two years. That's why holding provincial elections is important, and hopefully that will happen by the middle of next year.
Q. There's been some talk in Washington about sending more troops to Iraq — about a "surge" before starting the withdrawal. Would you have liked to have had 20,000-30,000 more soldiers?
A. I agree with Gen. Abizaid. I think [additional troops] could have an immediate impact, for a short period of time. But past that, I just don't see where it gets you anywhere. I don't know how many troops you would have to have to stop the sectarian violence you're seeing in Baghdad and up in Diyala. I don't necessarily think troops are the answer. For me, the real answer to the problems we have right now is for the government to be perceived as the government of national unity by its people. Not by us — it doesn't matter what we think. And that will provide us more security than any number of troops can provide us.
Q. Is it too late for the government to change people's perceptions?
A. I don't think it's too late in any way whatsoever. The Prime Minister has tried. It's a complicated situation, many political parties. And he's going to have to work his way through that. He understands as much as we understand that this is a political as much as a kinetic solution.
Q. But Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki himself seems to have a credibility problem.
A. I'm not going to say whether that's correct or not. There are problems in the Sunni neighbourhoods. The perception is that they are not getting what their Shi'ite brethren is getting. Most of what has occurred is slanted toward the Shi'ites. Their perception is that it's not a government of national unity. That's a real issue, with many of the ministries. That has to be fixed.
Q. Is that something the U.S. can do?
A. It's something the government has got to work out. I think we can help.