Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani
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AHMAD AL-RUBAYE/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Moqtada Sadr |
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The Shi'ite Radicals
The Players: Although there are a number of smaller players at the radical end of the Shi'ite political spectrum, the key radical leader is Moqtada Sadr, whose support base in the Shi'ite urban slums has been organized in the Mehdi militia, which has been skirmishing with Coalition troops since the U.S. first tried to arrest Sadr in April on murder charges. While Moqtada lacks the clerical status to compete with Sistani in the religious sphere, he is first and foremost a politician — while purporting to accept Sistani's leadership in the spiritual sphere, Moqtada is plainly competing with the political parties (SCIRI and Dawa) closest to Sistani, and doing rather well in that race right now.
The Script: Moqtada Sadr not only wants the Shi'ites to dominate in the new political order in Iraq; he plans to be the dominant voice among the Shi'ites — and has skillfully ridden the wave of anti-American anger triggered by U.S. efforts against him to his own advantage. Indeed, the fact that Sistani held a meeting with Moqtada, whom he would previously have dismissed as an upstart rabble-rouser, to help bring peace to Najaf is a sign that the young imam's stature has grown as a result of his battle with the Americans. Sadr's game plan has been to rally the Shi'ite street to confront the occupation, and thereby create pressure on Sistani to adopt stronger positions. While he shares the mainstream Shi'ite goal of ensuring that elections go ahead in January — and indications are that his party plans to participate — Moqtada hews more closely to the Khomeini doctrine of velayat-al-faqih (political rule by clerics), and hopes to eclipse more moderate Shi'ite parties at the polls, and in the streets.
The Challenge: Moqtada Sadr has managed in the course of his confrontation with the U.S. to build up himself a substantial standing within the Shi'ite body politic, and he now appears to be consolidating that standing by proclaiming himself ready to work with the new government in pursuit of elections. His future depends on his ability to maintain and consolidate his support by acting as much as possible in concert with Sistani and the mainstream. But it's a safe bet that he'll be the first and loudest among the Shi'ites crying foul in the event of any changes to the election schedule.
ROBERTO SCHMIDT/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Ahmed Chalabi |
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Ahmed Chalabi
The Player: The longtime exile once backed by the Pentagon to lead Iraq after Saddam, Chalabi has since fallen from favor amid a flurry of questions over prewar intelligence he supplied to Washington, his relationship with Iran and more. Although he was passed over for a cabinet-level role in the Interim Government, Chalabi nonetheless continues to wield influence and looks set to play a role in the national council create to advise the new government. A long-time political survivor in a dangerous region, it would be dangerous to count out Chalabi just yet.
The Script: Naturally, Chalabi's script has had to undergo several rewrites since it became clear to his backers in Washington that simply shoe-horning him into power would be a disaster. Unable to muster any significant support on the ground, Chalabi's star has waned as a contender for a top spot. Instead, he has sought to carve out an influential role for himself as a man who can mediate between opposing factions. He sought to help negotiate an end to the standoff between the Americans and Moqtada Sadr's men at Najaf, and has lately been mediating between the Interim Government and the Kurdish leadership over the fate of Kurdish autonomy. Although he has no substantial constituency of his own, an ability to mediate and therefore help manage the fractious politics of post-Saddam Iraq could ensure continued influence for Washington's erstwhile favorite — precisely because the U.S. is now ceding its formal political control over Iraq, leaving the Iraqis to settle their own differences.
The Challenge: Chances of getting Chalabi onto the throne now appear to be negligible; his next-best hope will be to parlay his ability to move between power centers from Washington to Tehran, Najaf to Suleimaniya into some sort of power behind the throne.
WATHIQ KHUZAIE/GETTY IMAGES
An insurgent fighter in Fallujah |
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The Sunni Insurgents
The Players: Initially dismissed as the work of Baathist "bitter-enders" and a handful of foreign jihadists, the insurgency centered in the Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad has raged on for more than a year, and last week's death toll throughout the region suggests it is far from over. U.S. officials have come to recognize that the insurgency is in fact a diverse movement — some of its elements being foreign fighters such as the Jordanian Qaeda-linked militant Musab al-Zarqawi, others being former officers of the old army or ordinary Sunni Iraqis guided by nationalist or Islamist beliefs, or both.
The Script: The statements and actions of the foreign jihadist element linked to Zarqawi have always made clear that they plan to wreak maximum havoc in the hope of disrupting any transition plan in Iraq, and forcing out the Americans and their allies (both foreign and Iraqi). Clearly many Sunni Iraqi nationalists and Baathists currently share that goal, and are ramping up attacks not only on the Coalition, but particularly on the Iraqi security forces to which the U.S. is hoping to transfer increasing responsibility. At the same time, the recent deal to end the fighting in Fallujah, which handed security responsibility to a unit composed largely of officers of the former military and included some insurgents in its ranks, suggested that at least some among the insurgents may be open to cutting deals. UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi urged the new government to pursue talks with insurgent groups, so that genuine Iraqi nationalists among them could be brought in and given a stake in a post-Saddam order. Neighboring Arab countries, as well as Coalition partners such as Britain, have also warned that the only way to tamp down the insurgency will be to give the Sunni population, fearful of the Shi'ite majority over which they have long lorded it, a greater stake in the new political order. Should initiatives along these lines be pursued, a split might develop among different components of the insurgency.
The Challenge: The more hard-line elements in the insurgency hope to prevent a new order taking root through a campaign of ongoing violence that keeps the new government off balance, forces it to continue to rely on U.S. forces and thereby potentially alienate Iraqis, and to prevent next year's elections being held and a Shi'ite majority will being expressed. Others may be more inclined to keep open the option of rejoining the mainstream if they perceive political options for defending and advancing their interests. That may be one reason the Interim Government is looking to move quickly to reassemble at least some elements of the old Iraqi military summarily dissolved by the U.S. last year.
MAYA ALLERUZZO/POOL
Prime Minister Iyad Allawi |
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The Interim Government
The Players: The top tier of the Interim Government headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi are survivors of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council, and the new administration's composition reflects a similar concern by its creators (primarily the U.S.) to balance representation among Iraqi ethnic groups. As a caretaker government, its mandate is strictly limited to organizing elections currently scheduled for January 2 to choose a new government. And it has defined security as its primary concern on the road to elections.
The Script: The new government faces the unenviable challenge of establishing its own legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis at the same time as adopting strong measures to help restore security. Thus, it has talked about adopting martial law, or similar emergency measures that may prove controversial, but which Allawi hopes will suppress the insurgency that has ravaged Iraq for the past 15 months. And the new prime minister also plans to resurrect whole divisions of Saddam's old army to help him do it. The insurgency does not represent the only challenge on the road to elections, however — although the departing U.S. administrator J. Paul Bremer has left in place mechanisms for Allawi and his allies to tightly control who may and may not participate in the election process and on what terms, those are rejected by important Iraqi constituencies. For example, the radical cleric Moqtada Sadr has made clear that he will use his street support to challenge any effort to curb or limit his influence at the ballot box. And up in the north, the Kurds are threatening to boycott the poll unless they're guaranteed the minority veto over a new constitution as promised by Bremer — a guarantee Allawi can't give without alienating the most important Shi'ite leaders. Given the security situation, and also the fact that many of the key leaders of the new government have little reason to expect that they'd be returned to power by the voters, the temptation may arise to delay the election. But the security crisis that could be sparked by such a move might function as a restraint. Instead, the new government may be hoping that if tough measures restore a modicum of security in Iraqis' lives, they may be inclined to vote for the incumbents come next January.
The Challenge: Establish independence from the U.S. in the eyes of ordinary Iraqis and the region; isolate the Sunni insurgents by giving as many former Baathist types as possible a stake in the new Iraq, and send them after the foreign jihadists; draw the skeptical Shi'ites closer by going all-out to organize elections and make sure that Moqtada Sadr's group is participating; keep the Kurds on board; develop a common understanding between Iran, Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. over the terms of a new Iraqi political arrangement. A tall order, to be sure, but the alternatives are ghastly.