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In an SEC filing last December, a minority shareholder of Chiquita's reported that the Lindners were pondering an auction to sell off Chiquita. All of which may explain the money trail the Linders left behind in Washington.
THROWING MONEY AT THE PROBLEM
Lindner, a nonsmoking, nondrinking, nonswearing Baptist, has been a major supporter of the Republican Party, its candidates and causes. This may account for the less than enthusiastic response that Lindner received when he first took his banana case to the Clinton Administration early in 1993. In fact, at that time the U.S. Trade Representative's internal memos show that bananas were a low priority for the U.S. government. What's more, USTR and State Department officials had given--and would continue to give--repeated assurances to leaders of Caribbean governments that the U.S. supported European preferences for their bananas. And not without good reason. Everyone was fearful that islanders unable to grow and sell bananas would turn to a much bigger cash crop--drugs.
It was against this background that in June of that year, Keith Lindner, then president of Chiquita and one of Carl's three sons in the family businesses, wrote a "Dear Ambassador" letter to Mickey Kantor outlining concerns over Europe's import restrictions. There was little response.
That December, Carl Lindner contributed a quarter of a million dollars to the Democratic National Committee, establishing himself as a generous supporter of both political parties.
Through the early months of 1994, the Lindner lobbying juggernaut concentrated on building congressional support to pressure the Clinton Administration into action. From January to August, lawmakers of both parties bombarded Clinton and Kantor with letters demanding action.
Among the more strident and persistent correspondents were Bob Dole, who would eventually campaign for the presidency aboard Lindner's corporate jet, and John Glenn, who counted Lindner as a campaign contributor.
In January, Dole and Glenn, along with Senator Richard Lugar, wrote to the President calling for "sustained interventions" with European Union officials to make clear that export quotas and licensing "are not an acceptable solution." By August, Dole and Glenn demanded that Kantor initiate a so-called 301 investigation. The name comes from a section of the 1974 trade law that gives the USTR authority to investigate foreign trade practices and impose tariffs in retaliation.
On Sept. 13, Dole arranged a breakfast meeting with Kantor and Lindner. A day later, according to an internal USTR memo, Kantor and his staff had a follow-up meeting with Lindner and his colleagues to discuss "possible strategies" to overturn the European quotas.