(4 of 5)
That may explain why there are virtually no pro-West candidates in the running to replace Yeltsin when a new President is elected in what everyone hopes will be the first-ever peaceful transfer of power next June. The scandals are potent political fodder not only because they discredit Yeltsin but also because they fit into a popular Russian myth that the U.S. somehow engineered the country's woes. As eager as Russians are to blame their own tainted leaders, they also point an accusatory finger at Washington for their failures.
The scandals are only tangentially about what Russia might have stolen from the West. Most of the billions looted or laundered belonged to Russia. The real victims have been the millions of Russian workers and pensioners who are often paid late by a government without the cash to function. The most chilling consequence of that for Americans is not financial but psychological. When Russia repudiated communism in 1991, Western values enjoyed immense admiration and influence. That has vanished as millions of Russians have learned to equate reform with corruption and free markets with theft and misery. The hostility to the U.S. that has built up is genuine and pervasive.
There is much to debate about what the U.S. did well or poorly to encourage Russia's transformation. The Clinton Administration hurt itself by steadfastly overlooking Russia's failures. Officials complained privately to Moscow from time to time about rampant corruption, but to listen to them now you'd think it had been at the top of their list for years. Suddenly they are trumpeting Clinton's stern warning recently to the latest Russian Prime Minister that corruption "could eat the heart out of Russian society." Last week Secretary of State Madeleine Albright acknowledged that the "Herculean task" of transforming Russia has not been "fully achieved."
Al Gore had hoped his work on Russia would serve as Exhibit A in proving his readiness to step into the President's job. Now it makes him accountable for the Administration's decisions. He will face questions about where the money that he helped pump into Moscow actually went and about his friendship with Viktor Chernomyrdin while the former Prime Minister was suspected of stashing away millions. Administration officials concede that they underestimated the groundswell of corruption that came with Russian privatization. They had plenty of intelligence about the kleptocratic shenanigans, but didn't want to let it derail more important business like nuclear security and preventing any rollback to communism.
It all has the smell of political red meat. Except when you ask the Republicans what they would do differently, the answer is: not much. They offer no fresh ideas, just stricter oversight of loans, more criticism of bad behavior, greater caution toward leaders. No one, not even firebrand Jesse Helms, who is about to launch Senate hearings, would stop all aid or cut Russia adrift. Candidates like George W. Bush don't disagree with the basic notion of engaging Russia either, so he's left to look for traction with the mushy "I'd manage it better" argument. Even the most skeptical voter can see that it is not in the national interest to let Russia fail and that the U.S. has nothing to gain by abandoning the great, unfinished experiment in reform now. Then Russia might really be lost.