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A deal would be a tribute to Albright's ability to build personal relationships. Her charm--the Valentine's Day flirt is typical--has enabled her to break through the formality of diplomacy and build ties that make it easier for her to keep those trains running on time. The links extend outside the Balkans. Palestinian chief Yasser Arafat, long a skeptic of U.S. intentions in the Middle East, trusts Albright to be an honest broker. And Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov--with whom she exchanges presents for their respective grandchildren--is closer to Albright than to Clinton.
Albright's relationship with Clinton has complexities of its own, but the President has given her freedom, as he did last week on Kosovo, to "close deals" when she can. Some White House officials gripe that she often hogs credit for diplomatic successes. "Nobody minds when Madeleine throws out the first pitch at ball games or puts on the Stetson hats," says a senior White House aide. "But what bugs people here is her good press at the President's expense." Albright sees her public stature differently: "I think I've made foreign policy very interesting to the American people," she explains. That's essential as America tries to find its place in the world. "We are going to face a real question about what the leadership role of the United States should be," she says.
Nowhere is that truer than in Kosovo, where only U.S.-led air strikes may be enough to bring Milosevic closer to concessions. Though his negotiators last week were willing to talk about political options in Kosovo, he remained adamant that no NATO troops would be allowed on Yugoslav territory. Albright's aides say she hopes for an eventual compromise that would put NATO troops in Kosovo without making the Serbs feel they are "losing" the province.
That will be a tough sell in Belgrade. And no one is sure what that kind of agreement would mean in the long term. Would NATO really support Kosovar independence with military force? The allies are keeping the answer to that question vague in the hope that Milosevic will be able to interpret it in a face-saving way.
In the meantime, the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Albanian group that has done the bulk of the fighting against Milosevic's men, continues to arm and train for a serious war against the Serbs. And while an occupation of Kosovo may help ease Albright's worries about more massacres, it offers no guarantee of an enduring peace and the possibility of a disastrous civil war when NATO leaves. Albright, like generations of diplomats before her, may find that all the charm in the world is no match for centuries of Balkan bitterness.
--With reporting by Dejan Anastasijevic/Belgrade and Mark Thompson/Washington