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Early this year, several Oxford branch managers and employees from various parts of the country held at least two meetings at Kott's Beverly Hills mansion. Rubenstein, according to a former employee, was at both meetings, but they were chaired by Kott. A source in the brokerage business says Kott has actually described himself as the "owner" of JB Oxford. When TIME asked Kott about his relationship with JB Oxford, he denied owning any stock and described himself as a consultant.
Rubenstein likewise rejects the notion that Kott is anything more than a consultant, and he adds that a two-year consulting agreement expired at the end of June and that Kott is now used only on an ad hoc basis. And yet Rubenstein's own comments about Kott make it clear that Kott has played a central role in the company, making him, at the very least, one of the two or three most important people there.
Kott not only has ties to several major shareholders, but he has also helped launch the discount-brokerage business, restructured the company's debt and supervised advertising and marketing. Until a few months ago, he spent 50% to 60% of his time at JB Oxford's headquarters--in an office that was larger than Rubenstein's own digs. (Although Rubinstein points out, "I have the corner office.")
Rubenstein's statements about Kott's office and the amount of time Kott spent there seem to contradict assertions that Oxford made in a civil case filed last year against Oxford, Kott and other defendants. After the plaintiffs tried to serve a summons on Kott at Oxford's offices, he and Oxford persuaded an appeals court judge to quash the summons. The main reasons: Kott had no office at JB Oxford, and he lived in Canada, not California. (Rubenstein says this isn't a contradiction because the office was provided to employees of Kott's consulting firm. Yet he acknowledges that the consulting-firm employee who occupied it was Irving Kott.)
The Kott connection may be disturbing, but does it matter to JB Oxford's clients? After all, Oxford portrays itself as little more than a passive order taker for customers who make their own investment decisions. In fact, Oxford customers can have their own "personal" brokers, and some of the brokers steer clients to specific stocks, especially stocks in which Oxford is a market maker, since the firm makes much bigger profits that way. (A market maker can sell out of its own inventory, rather than as a middleman between buyer and seller.) Brokers have every incentive to recommend such stocks because part of their compensation comes from the "spread"--the difference between the price paid by Oxford for the stock and the price charged to the customer. One of the stocks in which Oxford is a market maker is the controversial Hariston Corp.
Even if customers make their own decisions, there can be room for abuse. Former employees and customers say the firm sometimes overcharged for stocks through price-manipulation schemes. At least three disgruntled clients complained to state-securities regulators about such abuses; one of them claimed to have lost his life savings. Rubenstein, for his part, insists that Oxford's sales and trading practices are in line with industry standards and that there have been few customer complaints.