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Galatis sent a memo to DeBarba, then vice president of nuclear engineering, in May 1993. Galatis was threatening to go to the NRC, so DeBarba created a task force to address "George's issues," as they were becoming known. The aim seems to have been to appease Galatis and keep him from going public. DeBarba says the calculations that Holtec and Galatis used were overly conservative and that experience told him there was no problem. The pool hadn't boiled, so it wouldn't boil. If a problem ever developed, there would be plenty of time to correct it before it reached the crisis stage. "We live and work here. Why would we want an unsafe plant? We had internal debate on this topic," DeBarba told TIME. "Legitimate professional differences of opinion." In 1977, he says, the NRC stated, "We could make the choice [of a full-core off-load] if it's 'necessary or desirable for operational considerations.' But that does not mean that what George raised was not an issue. We have rules on this, and we want to get it right."
By October 1993, Galatis was writing to the chief of Northeast's nuclear group, John Opeka, and to Fox, who was then company president. Galatis mentioned the criminal penalties for "intentional misconduct" in dealings with the NRC. Opeka objected to Galatis' abrasive tone but hired another consulting firm, which also agreed with Galatis. Northeast moved on to yet another consultant, a retired NRC official named Jim Partlow.
In December, during a four-hour interview that Galatis calls his "rape case"--because the prosecutor, he says, put the victim on trial--Partlow grilled Galatis about his "agenda" and "motives." After Galatis showed him the technical reports, Partlow changed his mind about Galatis and began questioning Kacich about the apparent violations. In two March 1994 memos to Kacich, Partlow backed Galatis, scolded the utility for taking so long to respond to him and suggested that they should reward Galatis "for his willingness to work within the NU system...Let him know that his concern for safety...is appreciated."
DeBarba and Kacich created another task force but did not modify the cooling system. Kacich began having conversations with Jim Andersen, the NRC's project manager for Millstone 1, about Galatis' concerns and how to get through the spring 1994 off-load. Andersen, who works at NRC headquarters in Washington, has told the inspector general that he knew all along Millstone was off-loading its full core but didn't know until June 1993 that it was a problem. Even then he did not inform his superiors. In a bow to Galatis, Millstone modified its off-load procedure, moving all the rods but doing so in stages. Before the off-load, Northeast formally reported to Andersen what he'd known for months: that Millstone might have been operating outside its design basis, a condition that must be reported within 30 days.