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Judging solely from the bottom line, Perot's record probably would not qualify him for a performance bonus. General Motors -- bloodied, but unbowed -- only now is facing up to the need for far-reaching internal reform. No living MIA has ever been found in Vietnam. Texas enacted some of Perot's educational reforms (no pass, no play; reducing class size), but on Friday night far more students are still cheering touchdowns than prepping for calculus exams. But embedded in these crusades are important -- and not always reassuring -- clues as to how Perot might behave if handed the toughest challenge of them all: the presidency of the U.S.
Resting in a place of honor in Perot's office is a thin business self-help book, Leadership Secrets of Attila the Hun. It serves as a small reminder of the management style that made Perot a billionaire. "If you're in his way, he'll run over you," says a close associate who prefers anonymity to Perot's wrath. "He does not compromise well. Ross has two modes: your way and my way -- and we're going to do it my way." The problem is not that Perot refuses to listen; he in fact delights in bypassing the chain of command to call some subordinate himself with a question. But once Perot makes a decision, that's it -- no dissent -- either go out and do it or get off the team.
Even at General Motors, where he ridiculed other board members as "pet rocks," Perot had his fans. "I've never seen an executive so accessible to his own people," says former executive vice president Elmer Johnson, who negotiated Perot's $700 million buyout. "Maybe it's a little simplistic, like Ronald Reagan could be, but he knows how to prioritize and exactly where he wants to go." But the consensus is that Perot resorted too quickly to guerrilla tactics at GM, lobbing brickbats from the sidelines, rather than ever trying to build support on the board or enunciating a clear road map for reform. David Cole, the director of the University of Michigan's automotive studies center and a close observer of General Motors, says, "With Perot, you're either with him or against him. If you're against him, you're in deep, deep trouble. If Perot were elected President, he'd be about the closest thing we've had in a century to a dictator."
White, who was defeated for re-election as Texas Governor in 1986 largely because of opposition from teachers and football coaches who really wanted to tar-and-feather Perot, still says with admiration, "He galvanized the business leadership to get ((education reform)) done. He's a consensus player, as long as you sign up with him. He's a consensus of one." But Perot never understood political negotiation; he failed to bend when there was still room for accommodation. "Perot made school administrators his opponent," contends Mike Morrow, who headed the Texas Association of Professional Educators. "He'll have a hard time with compromise. If you say something he doesn't agree with, then he sees you as an adversary."