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Baker developed a remarkably close and productive relationship with Eduard Shevardnadze, then Gorbachev's Foreign Minister. In several of their encounters, the two men spent almost as much time on the internal problems of the U.S.S.R. -- the nationality question, secessionism, the need for price reform, and the growing pains of democracy -- as on international relations. Under Shevardnadze's tutelage, Baker learned that the single most important factor in Soviet foreign policy is Soviet domestic politics.
As Baker came to understand the magnitude of the social, political and economic challenges facing Gorbachev, he realized just how much leverage the U.S. had over the U.S.S.R. on everything from arms control to regional conflicts. When other presidential advisers urged a wait-and-see attitude toward Soviet reform, Baker countered that uncertainty over events in the U.S.S.R. was a reason not to stand pat but to take advantage of changes for the better before there were any changes for the worse. The U.S., he said repeatedly, should move quickly to "lock in" what it likes about what is happening in Soviet policy and politics. In short: deal with Gorbachev while the dealing is good.
That argument appealed both to Bush's pragmatism and to his inclination to look at the globe and think of the ultimate Rolodex. For Bush, those blotches of color stand not just for countries but for Presidents, Prime Ministers and potentates whom, in many cases, he knows well and calls by their first name. If a crisis erupts, Bush's instinct is to reach for a telephone. More trouble on the Turkey-Iraq border? Call Turgut Ozal. Another glitch in the trade talks? Call Toshiki Kaifu. For the past 2 1/2 years, the White House switchboard has often been more important to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy than the State Department, CIA and Strategic Air Command combined.
On Jan. 21, 1989, his first full working day as President, Bush put in a call to the Kremlin "to establish contact, just check in with the guy." Gorbachev was delighted. After hanging up, he remarked to an aide that this was clearly an American President who wanted to deal "face to face," a form of encounter in which Gorbachev excels.
They started a Dear Mikhail-Dear George correspondence. When several of Gorbachev's letters reiterated stale positions in boilerplate language, Bush complained that they seemed to have been drafted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry (as indeed they had). That was part of the reason he suggested they hold their first meeting at Malta. The two hit it off spectacularly. Gorbachev came away convinced that Bush would not try to exploit his difficulties, while Bush developed an even deeper sense of engagement in the fate of a fellow leader.
Since then, they have worked to preserve cordiality in their exchanges, especially when the subject at hand is nettlesome. Each is sensitive to any sign of cooling or annoyance in the other. During the gulf war in February, when Bush was delivering a tough message over the phone, his interpreter accurately rendered the words into Russian but in a harsh and reproving tone. Afterward Gorbachev asked an English-speaking aide who was listening in whether he was correct in detecting that Bush's "warmth" had got lost in translation. "Yes," the aide assured him. "It was friendlier in the original." Gorbachev was much relieved.