The camouflage-clad American troops with automatic rifles slung over their shoulders have all but disappeared from the streets of Riyadh. In the cool evening hours, Saudi families once again browse in the stores, examining electronic gadgets and comparing the latest imported luxury cars. In Jidda, gateway to the Muslim shrines of Mecca and Medina, preparations are well under way to accommodate the 2 million pilgrims expected during this month's hajj. Says an adviser to a senior Saudi minister: "We feel a cloud has been lifted from over our land."
Three months after the gulf war ended, Saudi Arabia seems to have returned to its placid ways. But the calm atmosphere is a mirage. Operation Desert Storm may be over, but it has unleashed powerful political and social crosswinds in the kingdom. Buffeted by the currents, King Fahd is struggling to preserve a precarious balance between secular moderates and religious conservatives while opening up the family-run government to his subjects. At stake is not only the direction of Saudi society, but also the survival of a royal dynasty that has ruled the country since its founding 60 years ago.
Saudi officials even claim that the country is slightly strapped for cash. The government has been forced to borrow $7 billion to fulfill commitments to the U.S.-led alliance. Despite a wartime surge in oil production from 5.5 million to 8 million bbl. a day, Western economists estimate a budget deficit of $25 billion this year. Skittish about both the expense and foreign entanglements, Fahd has reneged on an agreement to base a Pan-Arab defense force composed primarily of Egyptian and Syrian troops on Saudi soil. The plan envisaged an exchange of Egyptian and Syrian military manpower for economic and financial aid.
The country's postwar foreign policy has been a mix of shortsightedness and self-interest. Like the Bush Administration, Fahd had hoped Saddam Hussein would be a casualty of the gulf war; the King now fears that a Shi'ite-dominated Iraq possibly aligned with Iran is worse than coexisting with a weakened Saddam. Washington's hopes of Saudi leadership in the intensified search for Arab-Israeli peace were dashed when Riyadh refused direct participation in negotiations with Israel. Only under intense U.S. pressure did the Saudis consent to discuss such peripheral issues with Israel as arms control and water rights if a peace conference is convened. Fahd has not forgiven Jordan's King Hussein and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat for their support of Saddam, further complicating U.S. efforts to forge a united position among Arab moderates.
Eager to show Washington that he is willing to embrace at least some democratic principles, Fahd announced plans in April to appoint a Consultative Council to advise the policymaking Council of Ministers. By Western democratic standards, the proposal is modest. But in the autocratic gulf region, any step to broaden participation in government is radical. Fahd first proposed a Consultative Council more than a decade ago, but shelved the initiative when the Iranian revolution aroused fears of regional instability.