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Meeting with Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh and me in Moscow on the morning of Feb. 18, Aziz said that in spite of the brutal strike inflicted upon Iraq, it would not surrender -- and that was final. "Your stand seems very inconsistent," said Gorbachev. "On the one hand, this is an important step toward a political settlement, since you acknowledge Resolution 660, calling for an unconditional withdrawal. On the other hand, your positions seem to include preconditions for that withdrawal." Gorbachev also wanted to know why the withdrawal statement "did not use the word Kuwait."
The President offered the Iraqi leadership the following plan: Iraq would announce a total withdrawal from Kuwait (not just in general terms). It would also set a specific deadline for the end of the pullout that should be as short as possible. The withdrawal would begin immediately after the cessation of armed actions and would have "no strings attached." With one exception: a guarantee that troops departing from Kuwait would not be attacked -- "shot in the back." Said Gorbachev: "The timing is crucial. If you cherish the lives of your countrymen and the fate of Iraq, then you must act without delay."
Aziz left for Baghdad later that same day, and the tension-filled hours ticked into days as we waited for news from Iraq. On the evening of Feb. 20, we received a message from our embassy in Baghdad: Aziz had requested that a Soviet plane be sent to Iran to take him on to Moscow. The next day, in a clear indication that the talks would not be easy, Saddam Hussein gave an inconsistent and emotional speech over the radio in which he repeated the whole set of accusations and threats. Still, Aziz returned to Moscow around midnight and was brought directly from the airport to the Kremlin for talks. Gorbachev never got to leave the office that night. They blocked out a few general areas of agreement. The main one was that Iraq accepted Resolution 660 and was prepared to remove all its armed forces from Kuwait. However, the Iraqis claimed that they would be unable to complete the withdrawal by the proposed deadline.
We pointed out that Iraq had been able to bring its forces into Kuwait in a matter of hours. But Aziz replied that it had only been two divisions and that approximately 500,000 men had been concentrated in Kuwait during the seven months that followed. Gorbachev took a firm stand: "The proposed deadline can and must be reduced to a minimum."
Since time was passing quickly, presidential press spokesman Vitali Ignatenko held a briefing at 3:30 a.m. to announce the points of agreement that had been reached with the Iraqis. He said work would continue, and we expected further progress to be made. Hope was mounting.