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The main allied push, when it comes, will set off large tank battles. Iraq's armored force is the fourth largest in the world. Its most modern battle tanks are the Soviet-built T-62 and T-72, both of which are considered inferior to the U.S.'s M1A1. In any case, the allies will not rely on tank-to-tank combat but will call in air strikes by A-10 Thunderbolts and missile-launching helicopters. In the desert there is no cover for armored vehicles, which churn up a dust cloud behind them wherever they go. "They move, we see 'em," says an A-10 pilot in Saudi Arabia.
Allied engineers will then begin cutting roads through the minefields. At that point, the Republican Guards will have to concentrate their dispersed, dug-in forces and counterattack. The day and night bombardment by B-52s and missile attacks from planes and helicopters will continue. The international forces will quickly be free to roll across Kuwait. "The Iraqis have never faced major maneuver operations," says Cordesman.
With defeat facing him, most analysts believe, Saddam will use every dirty trick at his disposal. He will load his guns and multiple-rocket launchers with chemical weapons and use those weapons in large numbers. They will not be a decisive weapon but may advance his plan to cause as many deaths as possible. He will also fire off his Scuds with chemical warheads, if he has them, at Israel in another attempt to widen the war and crack the coalition.
Saddam's vanished air force may reappear. His best planes -- MiG-29s and F-1 Mirages -- and his French-trained pilots have fled to Iran. But at least 350 others, mostly older MiGs, remain in Iraq in revetments and shelters. He could launch these, armed with conventional or chemical bombs, against the allied ground forces. He might even send some of them on kamikaze-style, one-way missions into Saudi Arabia and Israel. "Saddam appears prepared to lose those aircraft in strikes against us," warns a Pentagon general.
There are other potential Iraqi surprises. Saddam, remembering the damage done to the U.S.S. Stark by an Exocet missile in 1987, could attack allied ships in the gulf with either air-launched or sea-launched Exocets. They would do little damage to a battleship or cruiser but could cause havoc on a destroyer or frigate. It is also possible that Iraqi frogmen might try to swim in and plant mines in Saudi ports or oil facilities.
None of those outrages, even if they succeed, can change the outcome of the war. There is no way Saddam can win militarily, and he must know that. His plan is to win politically and psychologically by spilling allied -- mainly | American -- blood. The longer the allies keep him at arm's length and pound his forces with bombs and missiles, cutting his supply lines, the faster his military power ebbs. His only hope, as his cross-border thrusts showed last week, is to lure the allies into an early ground battle.
The strategic debate over the war's end game is beginning to resemble the one that took place earlier on the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Sanctioneers argued for more time to allow them to work, to disrupt Saddam's military strength. George Bush decided he could not wait. Now air strikes on Iraqi military positions are a kind of sanction with teeth, weakening Iraq's fighting abilities, destroying men and equipment.