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So far, the car has earned respectful -- but qualified -- reviews from car critics, who praise its crisp handling, handsome interior design and solid workmanship. "A major step forward for General Motors," said Road & Track, while Motor Trend lauded the sports coupe as "a remarkable feat for the home team . . . something to be proud of." Even so, some critics complained about excessive wind noise and the raucous sound of Saturn's engine at high r.p.m., which Car and Driver described as "a chorus of Osterizers." Other critics found Saturn's styling to be too similar to other GM models.
Most experts conclude that Saturn ranks with its Japanese competitors as a noble contender -- if not yet a knockout champion. What cannot be known for sure at this point is probably the most important single factor: Saturn's reliability. In that department, the company is taking no chances. Only 1,000 Saturns will be ready for sale this week, about half the number expected, because the plant has slowed down its production to iron out any initial bugs. "We've had to do some tweaking," a Saturn official explained. Once rolling, Saturn aims to boost production to 250,000 a year by the end of 1991 and 360,000 by 1995.
For the first time in years, GM's timing of a new product seems uncannily accurate. Saturn's debut coincides with rocketing gasoline prices and a looming recession, all of which should be a boon to a small, inexpensive car that gets 27 m.p.g. in city driving and 37 m.p.g. on the highway. In Spring Hill, Saturn executives exude a cocky optimism that their moment has arrived. They are confident enough in Saturn that they chose Southern California, the heart of import country, as one of the first launching points. Saturn's goal is to sell 80% of its cars to import buyers. "We're really out to get the guy who's driving the Civic or the Corolla. That's the niche," says Richard (Skip) LeFauve, a former Navy pilot who runs Saturn with quiet self- assurance.
Why is Saturn so revolutionary for American industry? Primarily because this attempt to reverse GM's industrial decline acknowledges for the first time on ! a large scale the real reason for Japan's manufacturing superiority over the past two decades. The secret is not advanced technology or low wages or some mystical Asian work ethic. Japan's most important advantage is its management system: the way it deals with employees, suppliers, dealers and customers. This month a historic, $5 million M.I.T. study of the world's auto companies concluded that Japan's advantages boil down to a few elements, including teamwork, efficient use of resources and a tireless commitment to improving quality.
The philosophical nature of Japan's automaking edge was proved once and for all with the success of the first Honda plant in Marysville, Ohio, where American workers build Accords whose quality rivals or exceeds the same cars built in Japanese plants. Following the example of Toyota chairman Eiji Toyoda, Japanese companies in the 1960s and 1970s effectively reworked Henry Ford's theories, replacing his intensely hierarchical assembly-line system with a more flexible team-based arrangement. Japan's efforts have been fruitful. In the past decade the Japanese have built 11 plants in the U.S. and Canada with the capacity to make 2.6 million cars a year.