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At times the Sununu-Darman duet sounded discordant, but it was almost always planned. Their relationship had become the most powerful axis in the White House. Each gave the other what he lacked: Sununu provided Darman with access to Bush; Darman provided Sununu, a Washington neophyte, with a knowledge of the workings of Congress, government and Washington. The two men meet each morning at 7:15 and speak by telephone 20, sometimes 30, times a day. Both possess quick, assertive minds; both have a weakness for pranks and practical jokes. And both men are fighters. But where Sununu wrestles, Darman boxes. Says a senior Administration official: "Sununu relies on his wits, on thinking off the top of his head. Darman is a planner. He's always five steps ahead of you." He adds, "The difference between Sununu and Darman is that Darman knows when he's lying to you."
In spite of the good cop-bad cop routine, the talks went nowhere. Gradually, it dawned on the White House that the Democrats were stalling -- and scoring political points as a result. By mid-June the Democrats were threatening to walk out of the talks unless the President made a public commitment to tax increases, reversing his most cherished campaign pledge -- and his most potent weapon for bashing the other party.
Thus Bush's reversal on taxes required delicate handling. By the beginning of 1990, many Administration officials openly acknowledged the need for taxes. These included Darman and Sununu, aides to each explained, though neither admitted it publicly. And Bush? No one is sure, but those closest to him suspect that the President accepted the need for a tax hike gradually, not at some specific moment. The real question was, When should the U turn take place? Wait until 1991 and the reversal could damage Bush's 1992 re-election campaign. Wait until late 1990 and it might overshadow the budget deal itself. Better, aides figured, to do it as soon as possible. Some Republican candidates might suffer, but most of the incumbents are unbeatable.
Then fate took a hand. In mid-June, the economy took a nose dive, dragging corporate profits and federal tax receipts down too. In mid-June Darman boosted his 1991 deficit estimate to $159 billion, up from $138 billion just a month before. Unless a plan for cutting almost $100 billion could be produced by Oct. 1, spending cuts required by Gramm-Rudman would force the layoff of thousands of government workers. Within days, Administration officials began to utter dire predictions. It was the perfect opportunity for a sudden conversion, and Bush took it.
The breakthrough occurred at a White House breakfast for Democratic leaders on June 26. House Speaker Tom Foley urged Bush to make a short statement that "tax increases" would be a part of any budget accord. When Bush asked Foley to suggest such a statement, one observer said, "a lot of jaws in that room dropped." Foley dictated a version off the top of his head. Darman said it would take only a few minutes to draft, and began writing. He showed the draft to Sununu, who passed it to Foley. After a few changes, Bush looked it over, called in press secretary Marlin Fitzwater, and told him to release it.