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Almost all diplomats here seem to be operating on the assumption that an attack by U.S.-led forces could begin within two weeks -- as soon as the weather turns cooler in the desert and in the gulf. This is their perception, colored by living at the epicenter of the tensions and years of reading between the lines of coded cables. They say that it is the heat, and not just the desire to maximize manpower and equipment levels or the possibility of diplomacy, that has delayed a military response until now. Radar screens blacked out from the high temperatures, missile-control systems failed on some aircraft, metal alloys expanded on planes, causing leakage from fuel lines, cooling systems faltered and sand-fouled tanks and guns. These problems, the diplomats say, should ease after the first or second week of October.
Among those closest to Saddam Hussein, some aides appear to be both increasingly appreciative of how close to war the country is and at the same time stubbornly convinced that Iraq will find ways to avoid conflict and prevail through diplomacy. There are still indications that Iraq may pull back its troops in Kuwait and hold on to only that portion of the sheikdom with the most strategic and economic value: the Rumaila oil fields, two offshore islands and perhaps four harbors on the gulf.
Meanwhile, Iraq's senior officials seem convinced that an American-led attack will be launched in October or November unless they can induce one of the major powers -- France is the primary target -- to break ranks with the U.S. The Iraqis acknowledge that they badly misjudged American reaction to the annexation of Kuwait. They have been stunned by the swiftness and size of the U.S. deployment as well as by Washington's ability to rally so many European and Arab nations. Sitting in their offices, listening to their obligatory + attacks on Israel, the sheiks and the U.S., one senses that they are dazed, even desperate.
"Our hope is in the street," said a top Saddam aide, referring to the region's tens of millions of poor Arabs. "That is where America has miscalculated -- that and our ability to engage the United States in a long conflict. Iraq did not bring harm to U.S. interests. We will guarantee America's legitimate interests in the region -- low oil prices, free from the fluctuations of the past. But if we are attacked, every Iraqi will defend his homeland, his religion." It is a litany frequently heard here, and one now senses resignation -- not belligerence -- in conversations with officials.
There are also increasing indications that Saddam may be miscalculating the will of his people. TV screens are filled with images of jeering masses of civilians and of soldiers proclaiming their hatred. The reality seems far different.
Even in the intimidating atmosphere of Saddam cultism, it doesn't take long before some Iraqis share their war-weariness, their discontent, even their hatred of Saddam. Their frankness comes as a surprise; obviously, those willing to talk are the exception, not the rule, and the fact that they can speak some English indicates that they may not totally reflect the country at large. They concede their sense of powerlessness. But they are persuasive in their insistence that the undercurrent of discontent runs deep, that it is a given in discussion among friends and family who can be trusted.