(6 of 10)
Unfortunately, Stalin was not always so sensible. Some time later, during another meeting with Gottwald, Stalin asked if the Soviet Union should move its troops into Czechoslovakia. The reason could have been simply that the cold war was gaining momentum. Truman was President, and Stalin feared war with America.
Gottwald answered, "Please, Comrade Stalin, anything but that! Under no circumstances should you send Soviet troops into our country. It would poison the well and create impossible difficulties for our own Communist Party."
Fortunately, Stalin was just probing. Thank goodness we didn't move troops into Czechoslovakia -- at least not on that occasion. The Czechoslovaks had the warmest and the most brotherly feelings toward us, especially compared with the peoples of certain other countries.
In 1955 we established the Warsaw Pact. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was instructed to prepare some proposals for the organization. He came up with a list of member states that did not include Albania and the German Democratic Republic.
"Why aren't these countries on the list?" I asked him.
Molotov answered that Albania was far away; it had no common border with the U.S.S.R. There was no way we could help Albania. As for the G.D.R., he threw the question back at us: "Why should we fight with the West over the G.D.R.?"
, I was amazed, but I patiently tried to explain the matter to him. "Don't you see, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, that if we form a military organization with some socialist countries but not the G.D.R. and Albania, we'll be sending a signal to our Western foes. We'll be telling them, to put it crudely, 'You are allowed to eat up Albania and the G.D.R.' We'd just be building up the appetite of the Western revanchists."
In the end all of us, Molotov included, favored having the G.D.R. and Albania join the Warsaw Pact.
In 1956, when we were debating whether or not to use military force against the counterrevolution in Hungary, I had a sharp disagreement with another comrade, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, which caused me genuine sadness. Anastas Ivanovich and I were very close.
Neither he nor Mikhail Suslov, the senior party ideologist, was at the meeting ((at which the Soviet leaders decided to crush the Hungarian revolution with tanks)). They were in Hungary, trying to deal with the situation that was developing there. Mikoyan flew home only after we'd made our decision. His apartment and mine were on the same floor. When I told him about our decision, he objected strenuously that armed intervention was not right and that it would undermine the reputation of our government and party.
I replied, "The decision has already been made. Besides, I agree with it."
Anastas Ivanovich was quite agitated. He even threatened to do something to himself as a sign of protest -- I don't want to use his ominous words -- something about ending it all.
"That would be very stupid," I told him. "I know that if you think about it, you'll see the necessity for our decision." Fortunately, he calmed down. We sent in our troops. Budapest put up quite a bit of resistance, but it was all over in a matter of days.
Cuban Crisis