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Rather than initiate a military conflict, the U.S. and its allies hope to resolve the crisis by bolstering the embargo's effectiveness. This could be accomplished by warning Jordan that if it does not stop supplies from reaching Iraq through its port at Aqaba, the U.S. will stop shipments from reaching % Jordan itself. As an inducement to King Hussein, oil-rich Arab states along with oil-hungry Japan have offered to make up any losses Jordan would suffer from such actions. The U.S. could also pledge to protect Jordan from any Iraqi military reprisal.
That strategy has its own potential dangers. The biggest threat is that Saddam would order his extensive network of agents in Jordan's predominantly Palestinian population to rebel against the King. Under the pretext of restoring order, Saddam could then move troops into Jordan. That would trigger intervention by Israel. Saddam would have accomplished his goal of transforming the confrontation between Iraq and most of the world into a showdown with Israel and the U.S. that would unite Arabs behind him.
So far, things seem to be going Washington's way. Turkey and other U.S. allies with good intelligence in Iraq have reported shortages of food and other vital commodities there. A White House official notes that desert operations cause frequent military-equipment breakdowns and require large supplies of spare parts, which are not getting through the blockade. "We're expecting Iraq's military to begin suffering breakdowns that they can't fix," he said.
At some point, the White House believes, Saddam's increasingly untenable situation will force him to make a choice: either to lash out militarily or to seek a diplomatic compromise. Some experts detected a few feeble hints last week that he might be willing to negotiate, or was at least trying to buy time. "Saddam is not interested in going down in flames," one official said. "He's interested in power. So if he calculates that his gamble in Kuwait is not working, he may try to cut his losses and conserve his forces for another day." Washington rejected Saddam's elaborate preconditions for talks, such as immediate Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. But in a shift, the Bush Administration told Iraq that it would negotiate in advance of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait so long as Iraq agreed to talks on the basis of that and other Bush demands.
Some within the Administration contend that an Iraqi retreat that left Saddam's formidable war machine intact, or him in power, would be unacceptable. Once American forces are strong enough, they would welcome some rash act by Saddam, such as an attack on Saudi Arabia's oil fields with high explosives or poison gas. That would give the U.S. an excuse to try to oust him by force. Other officials argued that the blockade alone, if it succeeded in forcing Saddam to disgorge Kuwait, would be enough to fell him. Said another senior official: "One way or another, we are going to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, and we don't think Saddam can survive that."