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Instead, Kohl put his talents to work on the domestic front. He instituted politically painful reforms of the tax and health-insurance systems and supported a tight monetary policy that made the German mark even hardier than the legendary Swiss franc. Annual economic growth doubled from less than 2% to 4%. His policies made the country so rich it can afford to pay $100 billion for unification and have enough left over to sweeten its relations with Moscow and Warsaw.
When Kohl did strike off on his own in foreign affairs, some of his bungles lived up to the pundits' dark predictions. He strained ties with Washington in 1985 when he insisted that Ronald Reagan visit a cemetery in Bitburg even after it was discovered that some Nazi SS troopers were buried there. His visit to Poland last November was badly mismanaged by his aides, and he alarmed the Poles and most of the world by playing domestic German politics with recognition of the postwar border.
His stubborn refusal to guarantee the Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland in the name of a united Germany demonstrates the pragmatic way Kohl calculates political possibilities. He expected the next election to be close, and he counted as many as 10 million voters as having some ties or sympathy with the German "expellees" from western Poland. By postponing the final word on the border issue, he made them feel his concern for them. He expects them to remember that when they step up to mark their ballots.
Kohl's favorite line is that he makes a good living out of being underestimated. An indifferent public speaker, he can be quite articulate in small meetings. He reads hungrily, concentrating on biographies and histories; he impressed Gorbachev last week with his grasp of Russia's past. If Kohl's girth and glad-handing make some people who do not know him think he is buffoonish, many who do finally meet him come away talking about his sharp mind. He takes the measure of an issue and comes up with a gut response on whether a policy will fly. Says Friedhelm Kemna, editor of Bonn's daily General-Anzeiger: "He thinks deeply that he is successful and doesn't need suggestions from others."
And now this perpetually undervalued man is the Unification Chancellor, even if some of his success was owing to good luck. The fact that Kohl happened to be the West German Chancellor last year had nothing to do with Gorbachev's refusal to keep East German leader Erich Honecker in power or with the march of hundreds of thousands of Leipzigers and East Berliners through city streets.
But when the Berlin Wall fell on Nov. 9, Kohl understood that unification was possible, and soon. During August 1989, 5,000 East Germans each week had arrived in the West through Hungary. In November, 130,000 streamed through the dust of the Wall. This was domestic politics, for which Kohl has an instinctive feel. He knew that the dissidents on the other side had won, that German communism was dead. And he knew that he could probably wrap up his re- election if he could bring the Germanys together. At the end of November, Kohl put forward a 10-point plan for unification. It startled his allies, who counseled caution and deliberation.