(2 of 3)
A. Yes, it is. I think it is very sad that the Soviet leadership has to use a huge secret-police organization to guarantee the program of reforms and some liberalization and some democratization. In the 1970s and '80s, the KGB was practically the only uncorrupted agency in the Soviet Union, a well- disciplined force. As such, it was important to Gorbachev as an instrument of policy. It was the KGB that from at least 1984 saw in Gorbachev the only promising candidate whom it could support and whom it wanted to be the new leader after the series of elderly and ailing leaders. The KGB felt the need for reform. It saw the catastrophic situation in the Soviet Union better than anybody else because it is the best-informed body in the Soviet Union about internal and external developments. From the start, Gorbachev asked the KGB to provide information for the government, an independent, objective view of the economic, social and political situation. The KGB remains an important tool for him. It is the only agency he has not restructured.
Q. So the KGB still performs its more negative functions?
A. Yes, the KGB still watches those who are politically dangerous to the regime, those who are in the political opposition, those who support nationalist and separatist tendencies, those who are generally against the communist system. Sadly, because the KGB is so important to the regime, to Gorbachev, the negative aspects of the KGB remain intact and ready to start repression again when the situation might demand it. Also, the KGB's massive internal espionage continues unabated. Abroad the KGB has a huge network of intelligence stations that is not really in proportion to the needs of the Soviet Union. The fact that the KGB remains intact, working, recruiting people, collecting information, is, I think, in contradiction to glasnost and perestroika and to the "new thinking" that changed and improved Soviet foreign policy. If the objective is relaxation between East and West, then espionage should be minimized as well, which is not the case with the KGB. It is slowly expanding abroad, with a bit more emphasis on industrial spying. There are more than 100 KGB agents in Washington and another 100 at least in New York City, and huge stations in West Germany, France and India, for example. The KGB still reinforces the prejudices, suspicions and misconceptions of the Soviet leadership, which remains paranoid toward the West. This means the KGB still tells the Soviet leadership and the armed forces that now that the Soviet Union is getting weaker, the West could resort to an attack. Nonsense.
Q. What was your greatest coup as a Western spy?
A. When I reported to the West that the Brezhnev leadership, in its profound misconceptions, ignorance and prejudices, became acutely fearful of a surprise pre-emptive nuclear strike on learning that the U.S. was developing the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Brezhnev leadership reckoned that if the U.S. was to possess strategic superiority, it would certainly stage a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. This information helped the West to realize the depth and danger of Moscow's paranoia.
Q. Might the KGB find the current disorders in the Soviet Union too much and act to topple the regime and the troublemakers?