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The dilemma for Gorbachev is acute. On the one hand, he dares not permit violent chaos to spread, nor preside over the breakup of the U.S.S.R. On the other, he knows that resorting to force would probably provoke even greater resistance to Moscow's rule and would certainly spell the end of his liberal reform program as a whole. A crackdown could also revive the cold war and end his plans to transfer resources from the military to the civilian sector.
The U.S.S.R.'s identity as the world's last multinational empire may be the tragic flaw in Gorbachev's vision. It may prevent him from going as far as he would like -- and as far as he must to succeed. Certainly the imperative of maintaining order and preventing the breakup of the country is a large part of his reason for opposing the removal from the Soviet constitution of Article 6, which gives the Communist Party a monopoly on political power. A confrontation looms with the Baltic states over their intention to cancel Article 6 and declare their own communist parties independent. The Lithuanian party voted last week to split from Moscow and declared its intention to create "an independent, democratic Lithuanian state." One-party rule, Gorbachev says, is vital to the success of perestroika. He opposed debate on the issue at the opening of the People's Congress in mid-December, saying it would have to wait until constitutional revision as a whole is considered. But he may not get his way in that respect -- as well as in many others. The Soviet Communist Party has already split into so many factions -- rightist, leftist, nationalist -- that it is less a single entity than an umbrella organization in which policy battles are being fought out. Pluralism in one party could precede the development of separate parties in the U.S.S.R.
The country hovers at the edge of the definitive changes that have swept Eastern Europe, but hesitates to take the plunge. Moscow's latest five-year economic plan, announced two weeks ago, still retains central control of production quotas and postpones vital price reforms until 1992. Gorbachev denies that he intends to move to a totally Western-style, free-market system. He insists that his perestroika can in time deliver democracy in a one-party state and efficiency in a planned economy.
In the meantime, Gorbachev's vision of an independent but cooperative international system has allowed five East European countries to emerge from communist dictatorship. They are fledglings, with no established economic or commercial systems, and even with help from Western governments and corporations, it is not certain they all will succeed. Their work should be eased by large newly formed national-unity coalitions such as New Forum in East Germany, Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia and the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria. Still, it is possible that after 40 years of Marxism ordinary workers will view the profit motive with hostility and insist that the government owes them a living. If that is the case, increasing penury could push Eastern Europe back into its 19th century bad habits: ethnic hatreds, border feuds, military juntas.