When Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci tours defense installations in the Soviet Union this week -- the most senior American official granted that privilege since World War II -- he will find the military in the midst of one of those profound shake-ups that have plagued the Red Army since Leon Trotsky helped build it in 1918. Under Mikhail Gorbachev's program of perestroika, the world's largest military machine faces unprecedented political pressure to slim down, open up and rethink its basic strategy. At the same time, the armed forces are plunging into the electronic age in a frantic drive to narrow the West's lead in high-tech weaponry. Taken together, the changes could revolutionize every aspect of Moscow's military philosophy, from the deployment of troops in Eastern Europe to its attitude toward nuclear war.
Gorbachev has little choice but to strive to bring the military under tighter control. While the armed forces have long occupied a privileged position in Soviet life, military spending has become a major impediment to Gorbachev's drive to revitalize the economy. Many Western experts estimate that the armed forces consume as much as 17% of the Soviet gross national product (vs. 6% for the U.S.). That comes to roughly $300 billion and places a heavy burden on the country. Observers agree that Gorbachev's restructuring of the civilian economy will not be possible without parallel changes in the military. Inevitably, as U.S. Naval Analyst Norman Polmar points out, "Gorbachev's reforms will directly confront major military interests."
The Soviet arsenal has traditionally been characterized by serviceable but relatively primitive weapons, known more for brute strength than sophistication. That is true as well of the military's tough but poorly trained personnel, who, because of ethnic diversity, often do not speak the same language; up to one-quarter of all Soviet draftees must be taught Russian before they can understand their commanders.
The U.S.S.R. has a standing armed force of 5.2 million (vs. 2.1 million for the U.S.), but Moscow's reliance on universal conscription of 18-year-olds means that morale and motivation are lower than in countries with all- volunteer forces, like the U.S. and Britain. In conventional units, the Kremlin has traditionally opted for quantity over quality, relying on large numbers of troops and weapons and de-emphasizing battlefield initiative and high technology.
Though the war in Afghanistan gave Soviet troops valuable combat experience, it exposed an array of equipment deficiencies. Machine-gun fire and U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles brought down heavily armored helicopter gunships. In a move reminiscent of the U.S. defeat in Viet Nam, Moscow called a halt to the fighting after nine years of frustration and began withdrawing its troops in May. Says David Isby, a U.S. military expert and author of Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army: "The vaunted Soviet military was basically fought to a standstill."