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Negotiations for a peaceful settlement started in 1982, but began to move ahead only last February, after Gorbachev declared that he would bring his troops home in ten months, instead of the twelve on which Moscow had insisted earlier, and would ensure that a "greater proportion" of the withdrawal would take place at the start -- a key U.S. concern.
Washington and Islamabad then realized Moscow was serious about leaving Afghanistan, and with that certain points already agreed upon turned into problems. For example, in 1985 the U.S. promised to cut off aid to the rebels once the Soviets began to leave Afghanistan, provided their withdrawal was rapid enough. But now some U.S. officials and legislators felt such a move would leave the resistance dangerously exposed. Islamabad balked because the Geneva proposals did not make provisions for the removal of the Najibullah regime, the most important demand of the mujahedin.
As talks resumed in Geneva six weeks ago, Moscow turned up the heat, * offering a withdrawal within just nine months. Zia tried to put on the brakes by issuing a demand: there could be no agreement without the establishment of an interim government in Kabul that included representatives of the resistance groups. Under pressure from the U.S. Congress to defend the mujahedin's interests, the U.S. raised the stakes even further by insisting that Moscow stop all military aid to Najibullah after the pullout. Moscow rejected both points, and Pakistan subsequently backed off from its interim-regime demand when it became clear that the fractious resistance leaders would never accept even token Communist representation in any coalition government.
Washington, by contrast, held its ground even as Moscow protested that it was being asked to drop longstanding treaty commitments to provide Kabul with military aid. Then, two weeks ago, U.S. diplomats turned Washington's position on its head in a compromise proposal made to the Soviets: Would Moscow go along with continued U.S. arms supplies to the mujahedin at levels "symmetrical" to Moscow's support for Najibullah? "Unacceptable" was the response by Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze threatened a unilateral Soviet pullout without an agreement at Geneva. In the end, Gorbachev apparently decided that a formal accord was too important to lose. "What they needed was a fig leaf," observed a Western diplomat in Moscow. "This allows ((the Soviets)) to preserve their position of principle."
The question now is what specifics for symmetry Moscow has in mind. U.S. State Department officials say they have proposed a moratorium on all arms deliveries for a year, beginning May 15. After that period expires, says a U.S. diplomat in Washington, "our actions will be directed by Soviet actions. If they resupply, we'll do the same. We will watch to see what happens." The approach appears to satisfy most of the mujahedin's supporters in the U.S. Congress. Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd, a Democrat, who backed a unanimous Senate resolution last month urging the Reagan Administration to stiffen U.S. terms at Geneva, said last week that his "concerns are being met."