(3 of 3)
Gorbachev's anticorruption drive, moreover, tends to hit hardest in those republics whose quasi-feudal party leadership has traditionally operated on a basis of bribery, kickbacks and influence peddling. Such leaders, in turn, may seek to whip up nationalist resentments against Moscow to protect their own positions.
At best, the uprisings in Armenia and Azerbaijan are an embarrassment for Gorbachev; at worst, they could prove fatal to him. Party conservatives are almost certain to turn the ethnic unrest into an argument against further liberalization. "What is the implication in these riots for Gorbachev?" asks Marshall Goldman, associate director of Harvard's Russian Research Center. "The implication is disaster. After 70 years of repression, it is not so easy to accomplish what he wants, and this will be a black mark against him by Russian nationalists and traditional centralists."
Others take a less gloomy view of the Soviet leader's position. "Gorbachev should be encouraged that the Armenian demonstrations are not anti-Soviet or even anti-Russian," argues Columbia University Sovietologist Jonathan Sanders. "As a political actor he has shown a very astute response." Stephen Cohen, a professor of politics at Princeton, notes that "Gorbachev himself has seen something like this coming and has been ready for it." He adds, "Gorbachev has already explained that everything he is doing represents a diminishing state control and unleashing the unpredictable. Nobody can know what will happen."
Much depends, obviously, on how the present crisis is resolved. Gorbachev has won a month's breathing space, but the Armenians may take to the streets again if he doesn't grant them some concessions. It is doubtful that Gorbachev will agree to redraw the boundaries, which would only encourage similar demands by other nationalities. Nor, if he can help it, is he likely to resort to a military crackdown that would tarnish his reform image at home and abroad. Perhaps his greatest advantage is that the Armenian people remain relatively loyal to the Soviet Union and seem to trust him personally.
When Gorbachev came to power, he showed little interest in the nationalities problem and focused all his energies on the economy. "Gorbachev doesn't care about nationalities," observed a Western diplomat in Moscow. "He only cares about who works most efficiently." Yet events seem to have thrust the issue upon his attention -- with a vengeance. He devoted a lengthy passage to the subject in his 1987 book Perestroika, vowing "not to shun this or other problems which may crop up." By last month he was calling nationalism the "most fundamental, vital issue of our society." And in the wake of last week's violence, he had to realize that it was becoming one of the greatest challenges to his own leadership.