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Nonetheless, the week's events strengthened the once lonely American military position in the Persian Gulf. Although the bloodshed led to renewed efforts in Congress to invoke the 1973 War Powers Resolution, the incident suggested that the U.S. finally seems able to muster both the will and the means to protect shipping against primitive but effective mining. That was an improvement from the summer days when American sailors could only stand futile watch with rifles as a defense against mines. Since the Bridgeton debacle, the U.S. has safely escorted nine U.S.-reflagged tanker convoys past Iranian missile batteries in the Strait of Hormuz.
Increasingly, once reluctant allies are applauding and even joining in the American determination to keep the gulf's international waters open. Since mid-August the U.S. fleet of 40 ships in the region has been joined by British, French, Belgian, Dutch and Italian warships and minesweepers.
The first drawing of Iranian blood by American forces produced sharp warnings from Iran that the Great Satan would be punished. As regular troops and Revolutionary Guards paraded through Tehran to mark the seventh anniversary of the gulf war, Khamenei vowed in New York that the "United States shall receive a proper response for this abominable act." U.S. military and diplomatic posts were placed on a worldwide alert against terrorist assaults.
While no one could predict where the U.S.-Iranian clashes might lead, the capture of the Iran Ajr gave the U.S. military a big lift. Defense Secretary Weinberger was elated as he hailed the operation: "We were capable, we were ready . . . and they ((U.S. forces)) did an extraordinary, skillful and difficult task very well." The successful military show was staged only a week after the FBI's seizure of a much wanted Shi'ite Muslim terrorist, Fawaz Younis, who was lured onto a yacht in the Mediterranean, seized and spirited off to stand trial in the U.S. for the 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner that carried four Americans among its 70 passengers and crew.
Instrumental in the success of the gulf strike were the efforts of Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Contending that it is far better to prevent minelaying than to hunt for explosives after they are planted, Crowe overrode interservice rivalries and dispatched a specially equipped and trained Army unit to join the gulf fleet. Three weeks ago he visited Rear Admiral Harold Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force on the command ship U.S.S. La Salle off Bahrain. The two officers worked on the plans to track and catch Iranian vessels capable of laying mines. Crowe gave Bernsen freedom to move swiftly once the trap was sprung. "The critical decision was his," Crowe told TIME last week. "I didn't want a long bureaucratic chain of command for this operation."