(3 of 6)
Poindexter, 50, related his amazing tale in ordinary, conversational tones, then broke out his pipe and lit up, as if he had come to the end of an after- dinner story. He matter-of-factly told the panel of the day in February 1986 when North said he had found a way to fund the contras with profits from the arms sales to Iran. At the time the rebels were running out of the $27 million in humanitarian aid the U.S. had granted them in 1985. Poindexter saw the diversion scheme as a way of providing "bridge financing" for the contras while the Administration struggled to persuade Congress to approve a $100 million aid package. "I thought it was a neat idea too," Poindexter said, echoing North's description of the deal.
Poindexter recognized that the diversion would be as controversial as it was neat. Thus, he said, he approved it without informing Reagan, in order to "provide some future deniability for the President if it ever leaked out." Poindexter argued that in authorizing the deal he was not making policy; he was only carrying out Reagan's established objectives. "My role was to make sure that his policies were implemented," said Poindexter. "In this case, the policy was very clear, and that was to support the contras." After working in the White House since June 1981, he said, "I was convinced that I understood the President's thinking on this."
Poindexter contended that during daily briefings he reported to Reagan "in general terms" on the status of the contras. He said he told the President of North's "instrumental" role in helping sustain the rebels, filling Reagan in on the secret airstrip built in Costa Rica by North's contra resupply network. The admiral said that while the President knew the rebels were being supported by private donations and contributions from third countries, he never asked where precisely the money was coming from. "The President . . . is not a man for great detail," said Poindexter, inadvertently provoking chuckles from the audience.
Poindexter insisted that he never discussed the diversion with any Administration official other than North. The admiral said he refrained from talking about the scheme with Casey -- even though the CIA had been deeply involved in previous contra activities. His rationale was that Casey often had to testify before the congressional intelligence-oversight committees and Poindexter did not want him to have to lie. North, however, told the Iran- contra committees that Casey knew all about the diversion.
Though Poindexter had the gumption to authorize the diversion, he seemed not to want to know too much about the deals: he testified that he never asked North how much money was being diverted to the contras; the admiral, known for his attention to detail, said he was not concerned with such bits of "micro- management."