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Asked Liman: "After all you've gone through, are you not shocked that the director of Central Intelligence is proposing to you the creation of an organization to do these things outside of his own organization?"
North: "Counsel, I can tell you that I am not shocked . . . You know, maybe I'm overly naive, but I don't see what would be wrong with that."
Liman: "Well, maybe you are . . ."
Nor could North ever adequately explain who was supervising the vast profits pouring into the Secord-Hakim accounts from Iran arms sales. No one in the U.S. Government, it seemed, had actually monitored the huge cash flow. North claimed that it was his job to tell Secord just where to send money and that he trusted the general to do whatever was directed. Yet North admitted he was "shocked" to learn that only $4 million had gone to the contras, while some $8 million remained in Secord's control. North challenged Nields' assertion that this money belonged to the U.S. Treasury, even while conceding that it was not Secord's to spend as he wished.
On the "smoking gun" memos in which North had outlined the diversion plans, Liman presented many documents in similar form but on far less significant topics that North had sent to Poindexter for presidential approval. These had been returned to the NSC aide's files with notes from the National Security Adviser indicating that Reagan had indeed given the plans a green light. The implication was clear: it would be extraordinary if a proposal for the diversion, with consequences serious enough to endanger the Reagan presidency, did not reach Ronald Reagan's desk. Unless, of course, North's foxy superiors had really intended to let the eager, can-do Marine twist slowly in the wind.