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Colonel Carmine Delgrosso, a 24-year Marine veteran, has commanded the embassy guard battalion since May 1986. In an interview last week, he defended the record of the Marshall Hall training program and the overall record of Marine guards. Occasionally, Delgrosso was nearly overcome with emotion as he talked of his loyalty to the Corps, his eyes filling with tears. "In a security system, the last thin, red line is the human factor," Delgrosso said. "In the end, everything centers on integrity. How do we guarantee integrity? We look for maturity, judgment. It's clear that Lonetree and Bracy had a problem with integrity."
Former Marines like McCloskey point out that Marine guards held back a brick-throwing mob when the embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, was burned in 1979. But some say embassy guard duty, which the Marines shouldered in 1949, is unsuited for a group that is supposed to be a well-honed fighting force. Indeed, perhaps the most fundamental problem faced by the Marines, one that affects both their morale and their effectiveness, is that their mission has become murky.
Aside from Grenada, the last time the Marines launched an amphibious assault under combat conditions was during the Korean War, when General Douglas MacArthur chose them for the Inchon landing. Marine strategists insist that the Corps retains a vital role in modern warfare. Lieut. General Alfred Gray, who commands the Fleet Marine Force (Atlantic), admits, "You'll never see staged assaults like Iwo Jima or Tarawa again." But Gray, who is thought to be one of the leading candidates to succeed Marine Commandant P.X. Kelley, adds, "Our mission is sustained power projection. For power to be sustained, it must come from the sea."
Other branches of the service are trying to mimic or duplicate the role of the Marine Corps by imitating its fast-and-flexible style; the Army, for example, is developing lightly equipped divisions for quick deployment. Even more disturbing are signs that the Marines have begun to imitate some of the top-heavy characteristics of the other services: 30 years ago there was one enlisted Marine officer for every two grunts; now the ratio is 1 to 1. Less than one-third of the troops in each Marine division now have combat jobs, and the ratio of desk jobs to field jobs for lieutenant colonels is 9 to 1. Because of this shift from "tooth" to "tail," what is supposed to be a streamlined strike force resembles the rest of the military bureaucracy.
Critics of the Corps say it suffers from a lack of leadership at the top. The Marine commandant sets the tone, and Kelley, who was once perceived as a possible innovator, has been aloof and reclusive, almost solely interested in pursuing bigger budgets. Military Critic Edward Luttwak says the Corps is "wallowing in complacency." Some officers serving under Kelley at the Pentagon claim that the prevalent attitude is bureaucratic defensiveness. "Semper fi," grouses an officer at Marine headquarters, "means don't say anything critical because it's going to reflect on Kelley." Self-criticism is precisely what the Corps needs, say some experts. What they have instead, says one of Kelley's subordinates, is a "lot of bumper-sticker bravado."