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Political and moral considerations further complicated the military planning. The President's guidelines for retaliation against terrorists have always been to hit precisely defined targets and to minimize the chance of injuring civilians. Both concerns dictated a low-level attack with precision bombing. Furthermore, it would have to be carried out at night, when few people were on the streets. A night raid was also likely to risk fewer fliers than a daylight attack. Taking all these factors into account, Crowe and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that additional aircraft would be necessary. The ones most ideally suited to the mission were the Air Force's F-111s at Britain's Royal Air Force Base at Lakenheath. Reason: like the Navy A-6 craft, the F-111s are equipped with infrared bombing sights capable of highly accurate nighttime targeting.
After the Security Council met in the Oval Office on Wednesday, April 9, a joint security-intelligence team prepared a list of five targets. First on the list was the Bab al Azizia army compound, which serves as Gaddafi's command center and residence. "We hit Gaddafi's barracks because it's the nerve center for his command structure and headquarters of his loyalist guard," says a top national security aide. There is little doubt that Azizia was also targeted in the hope that the Colonel would be very much at home and killed or injured in the attack. Using the military euphemism for civilian casualties, one Administration official deadpanned, "If Gaddafi had been killed, I don't think it would have been considered 'collateral damage.' " Indeed, an additional reason for staging a night raid was to catch Gaddafi asleep, though U.S. intelligence officials warned the Administration that the Colonel is believed to rotate his sleeping quarters for security reasons. No fewer than five F-111s were assigned to hit Gaddafi's compound. The hope, says a senior Administration official, was to "turn the barracks into dust."
Next on the hit list was the military section of the Tripoli International Airport, base of Libya's fleet of nine Il-76s, which have been used in terrorist operations for supply and transport. A third target was the Benghazi army barracks, which Gaddafi uses as an alternative command post. Then came barracks at the naval port of Sidi Bilal, near Tripoli, a commando training facility. Finally, security officials recommended a strike at the Benina airfield, where Libya's MiG-23 interceptors are based, as a precaution against counterattack.
A large wrench was thrown into the operation when the French and Spanish refused to permit F-111s to fly over their territory. A mission by U.N. Ambassador Vernon Walters to line up support from the allies failed to change their minds. So instead of flying 1,600 nautical miles due southeast from Britain to their targets, the squadron would be forced to keep to international skies and detour 2,800 nautical miles around the Iberian peninsula.
Reagan gave final approval to the plan on Sunday, April 13, following his return to the White House from Camp David. In doing so, the President asked Admiral Crowe how late he could still order a cancellation of the mission if conditions should warrant a change of plans. The Joint Chiefs Chairman assured his boss that he could command a turnaround as late as ten minutes before strike time.