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In Washington, once the intelligence information had been assessed, there was never any serious debate about what the U.S. should do. "We'd been a pretty determined bunch ever since the Achille Lauro," said one senior Reagan official. "The only major point of discussion was targeting." Reagan insisted that the targets be chosen with a view toward holding down casualties among Libyan civilians. That damage nonetheless occurred in downtown Tripoli might indicate that a so-called surgical air strike is much easier to plan than to achieve.
Although military action was decided on Monday, April 7, final approval of a plan and targets did not come until the following Sunday. That allowed time for a last-minute mission by Vernon Walters, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and a veteran troubleshooter, to sound out European allies on their attitudes. On Saturday, Sunday and Monday, he visited in quick succession London, Madrid, Bonn, Paris and Rome.
Walters' mission, however, became a source of new controversy. Several European leaders contended that Walters, while making it clear that the U.S. was seriously considering a military strike, put all his comments on a what-if basis. As a result, they said, they got no impression that an attack had already been ordered, much less that it was within days or even hours of beginning. Added to their concern about being caught in the middle of a cycle of military reprisal and terrorist vengeance was a resentful feeling that the U.S. had failed to consult them properly, and perhaps had even misled them.
France had already refused a U.S. request to permit the F-111s to fly over her territory before Walters met with President Francois Mitterrand and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. An official French government statement later explained that Paris was fearful of intensifying "the chain of violence" by abetting the U.S. military strike. France may also have been reluctant to become involved in any military action that it did not initiate and could not control. Another factor: the newly installed Chirac government had just renewed efforts to win freedom for eight French hostages in Lebanon and did not want to endanger them--a concern that was justified by the subsequent execution of British and American hostages.
Walters implied that Spain also had refused overflight permission before he got to Madrid Saturday. Said the Ambassador: "Sometimes it is better not to ask the question when you don't think you will like the answer." But Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez said later that during his meeting with Walters, the Ambassador--again on a what-if basis--specifically asked if Spain would permit overflight, or, failing that, at least allow tanker planes taking off from Spanish bases to refuel the F-111s in flight over the Atlantic. Whenever asked, Gonzalez replied with a firm no.